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INTRODUCTION
On November 26, 2008, gunmen attacked two luxury hotels,
a train station, and a Jewish center in Mumbai, killing over
one hundred.' Twenty-eight of the dead were foreigners,
including six Americans.2  Early reports stated incorrectly
that the terrorists directed their attack at Americans.' The legal
response to incidents such as the Mumbai attacks will play an
important role in the continued struggle of the American
government against international terrorist groups. The current
legal framework-provided through antiterrorism laws,
particularly civil antiterrorism laws-fails to adequately answer
the most important question arising when providing a legal
response to terror: What justifies a country applying its own law
to the conduct of terrorists in foreign lands?
Somini Sengupta, Terror Attacks Kill Scores in India; U.S. Hostages Reported
Held at Hotels, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 2008, at Al.
2 Somini Sengupta, A Security Chief Quits as India Struggles To Respond to
Attacks, N.Y. TMES, Dec. 1, 2008, at Al.
3 Sengupta, supra note 1.
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If one were to attempt to justify the application of U.S. law to
the conduct of the Mumbai gunmen, which of the above facts
would be most relevant: that the gunmen were engaging in
terrorist acts, that they killed six Americans, or that the
gunmen's intended targets were reported to be American? This
Article answers that question by clarifying when a victim should
be able to bring suit under U.S. law for terrorist attacks abroad.
This Article proposes that the intent to harm U.S. nationals
because of their nationality constitutes the most important
factor when determining which terrorist attacks outside the U.S.
should give rise to civil suits within the U.S.
However, international law and domestic law ignore the
important element of the terrorists' intent towards the United
States and its nationals. Instead, the nationality of the victims-
whether they were the intended victims or not-is given undue
importance in scholarly and legal analysis of the extraterritorial
application of antiterrorism laws. This principle of passive
personality, that a country can prohibit conduct that harms its
nationals, fails to justify the application of antiterrorism laws to
terrorist acts that occur outside of the country wishing to apply
its laws.
This Article exposes that the extraterritorial application of
antiterrorism laws cannot be justified using the current
principles of international law on extraterritoriality-
particularly, universal jurisdiction, passive personality, and
protective jurisdiction. For example, the fact that the Mumbai
attackers were "terrorists," in the view of some, could justify the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Under the current
principles of international law providing the basis for a state to
apply its own laws extraterritorially-principles of prescriptive
jurisdiction-a state can apply its laws if the conduct violated
a universally recognized norm. This constitutes universal
jurisdiction. Thus, if one views the terrorist as the modern day
pirate, one would argue that international law does or should
contain a prohibition on such conduct enforceable by every
country. Currently, the international community lacks the
consensus needed to support this general antiterrorism norm.4
Without a consensus, universal prescriptive jurisdiction for
terrorist acts cannot be justified.
I See infra Part I.B.4.
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The fact that American nationals were killed also arguably
provides jurisdiction under the principle of passive personality-
another basis of prescriptive jurisdiction in international law.
The U.S. has chosen to organize much of its antiterrorism laws
around the principle that the U.S. has jurisdiction to proscribe
terrorist acts that harm U.S. nationals, even if they were not the
intended target. Passive personality fails to encapsulate the
national security interest of a state in applying its antiterrorism
laws because it will apply even when neither that country nor its
nationals were the target of the attack. Passive personality
remains controversial and many states, including the U.S., object
to its use in every other substantive area.'
Lastly, because terrorists target Americans, the U.S. should
be able to apply its own laws. However, the principle of
protective jurisdiction only allows a country to apply its laws
when the state, itself, is targeted. Protective jurisdiction, in the
view of the U.S. and many other countries, does not apply when
only civilians are targeted.
Domestic antiterrorism law and international law on
extraterritoriality have paid almost no attention to what seems
like the most important factor in determining whether the U.S.
should be involved through the application of its laws: Did the
terrorist target Americans because of their nationality?
This Article proposes using terrorists' intent as a means of
further buttressing the U.S. national security apparatus with
effective civil antiterrorism suits. Intent has an important role
in allowing victims to sue in U.S. courts because intent
constitutes the most effective way to align civil antiterrorism
suits to the U.S.'s national security interest. Civil suits have the
potential to make the U.S. safer by filling the gaps in the
national security framework left between nonlegal efforts in the
war against terror and criminal prosecutions. The national
security and intelligence apparatus have been imperfect in
discovering new threats. Criminal prosecutions are limited by a
higher standard of proof and the need to extradite the accused to
the United States. In contrast, civil plaintiffs and their attorneys
will investigate and file suit over terrorist attacks that the U.S.
government may have failed to scrutinize adequately. Using
intent as the limitation on whether a victim can sue will focus
' See infra Part I.B.3.
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these private attorneys general's attempts on the most relevant
factor for U.S. national security purposes: the intent of the
terrorist group toward the U.S. and its nationals.
This Article argues that due to the failure to develop
an alternative jurisdictional basis for unconventional security
threats, U.S. antiterrorism law and international law on
prescriptive jurisdiction are insufficient to address the threat
that international terrorism poses and must be reformed. The
aim of the proposed reform is to develop a new jurisdictional
basis that reflects when national security requires states to act in
the age of global trade and global terror.
My proposed concrete reform is predicated on principles of
security, legality, and practicality, and it is designed to achieve
the right balance between them. First, the principle of security
requires that the U.S. antiterrorism laws should only apply to
situations where U.S. national security interests are implicated
and not to cases where a U.S. national may have been an
innocent bystander in a conflict unrelated to U.S. interests-as
allowed in the current regime. Second, the principle of legality
necessitates that the prescriptive jurisdictional basis used must
serve to guide future attempts to use legal methods against
national security threats within the confines of international law.
Lastly, the new system must provide a clear way for judges to
evaluate the interests of the U.S. when deciding whether or not
to apply U.S. law to terrorist activity that occurred abroad,
satisfying the last principle-practicality. Currently, judges
often resist allowing lawsuits that implicate national security
and foreign policy concerns due to the difficulty in deciding what
interests are implicated.
In order to best balance these concerns of security, legality,
and practicality, U.S. antiterrorism law should contain an intent
element. This intent element will form a new basis of
prescriptive jurisdiction. A country will be able to apply its laws
extraterritorially to persons who intend to physically harm its
nationals because of their nationality.
An intent-based jurisdiction will make the U.S. safer,
satisfying the first principle-security. Under the current
regime, plaintiffs need only show injury to a U.S. national during
an act of terrorism. There is no requirement that the attack be
directed at the U.S. or its nationals. Under my proposed regime,
the intent of the terrorists becomes the primary focus. Thus,
[Vol. 83:12011206
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plaintiffs will spend time and money investigating terrorists'
intent regarding the U.S. and its nationals. Incipient anti-
American terrorist organizations, which may not currently
receive attention from the national security apparatus because of
their relative anonymity or lack of a large operational capacity,
will be examined by potential plaintiffs for their intent regarding
the U.S. and its nationals in carrying out an attack. Victims of
terrorist attacks will have this incentive to investigate the anti-
American nature of a group because it allows them to sue in U.S.
courts under U.S. laws.
On the other hand, attacks that are not directed at
Americans will no longer result in U.S. courts and U.S. law
assigning fault in local or regional conflicts. Because the current
framework only requires that a U.S. national be injured, attacks
carried out as part of domestic or regional conflict may be the
subject of dispute in U.S. courts if an American ends up as an
unintentional victim of the attack. Lawsuits over these types of
attacks implicate the U.S. in foreign policy quagmires, leading to
a greater chance of hurting rather than advancing U.S. foreign
policy or national security interests. The proposed reform will
reduce the instances where U.S. courts must adjudicate attacks
arising from conflicts where U.S. national security interests are
not directly implicated, satisfying the concerns of security.
An intent-based national security jurisdiction will
also provide a framework for development of international
law regarding the extraterritorial application of law to
unconventional security threats. The current U.S. antiterrorism
regime uses passive personality jurisdiction-the idea that a
country can proscribe conduct that injures its nationals. Using
the nationality of the victim as the limiting factor results in the
application of U.S. law to many situations where the U.S.
national was an unforeseen victim, and the national security
interests of the U.S. are not implicated. Unfortunately, the other
types of prescriptive jurisdiction recognized under international
law cannot properly apply to general antiterrorism legislation.
Universal jurisdiction remains unavailable. With the exception
of limited types of terrorist acts that are prohibited under
widely ratified international treaties, international law does not
recognize a prohibition on terrorist acts sufficient to justify the
use of universal jurisdiction. Another possible basis, protective
jurisdiction, also does not apply. Protective jurisdiction only
2009] 1207
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allows extraterritorial application of a country's law when an
attack is meant to disrupt an important government function.
Terrorist acts against civilians will often not qualify. A new
intent-based jurisdiction will draw from the justification for these
current jurisdictional bases of international law. It will do so in
a manner that tailors the security interest of a state to situations
where its laws are applied, thus responding to concerns of
legality.
Lastly, an intent-based jurisdictional basis will be easier to
apply than passive personality, when one considers that other
freestanding procedural doctrines are now used to limit the scope
of substantive antiterrorism law. The current antiterrorism
laws appear to apply broadly. However, plaintiffs often fail to
recover because they are unable to obtain personal jurisdiction or
have their cases dismissed based on forum non conveniens or
sovereign immunity grounds. By requiring the element of intent
to harm U.S. nationals, the procedural doctrines that are meant
to filter out cases without a strong relationship to the U.S. can be
integrated into the substantive law. Thus, judges will look more
favorably on such claims because they can be assured that the
U.S. has a strong interest in adjudicating civil antiterrorism
claims. In limiting the substantive law, Congress can clarify for
courts that in cases where terrorists target U.S. nationals, U.S.
courts should apply U.S. law and judges should be hesitant to
dismiss the case. The proposed reform will be more practical
than the current system or any alternatives.
This Article develops the proposal in three parts. Part I
of this Article analyzes the current prescriptive jurisdictional
bases of passive personality, universal jurisdiction, protective
jurisdiction, and the other traditional bases of prescriptive
jurisdiction-nationality and territoriality. Part II of this Article
surveys the current framework for suing perpetrators of acts of
international terrorism. It argues that apparently broad
substantive law is unduly narrowed by procedural doctrines
unrelated to concerns about terrorism. Part III argues that
"intent-based national security jurisdiction" will allow civil suits
in U.S. courts to expose terrorist acts and terrorist groups that
threaten U.S. national security in a manner that will make the
U.S. more secure, make application of U.S. law more acceptable
to other countries, and make judges more willing to entertain
causes of action involving terrorist acts abroad.
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I. SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE: USING AN ILL-FITTING PASSIVE
PERSONALITY JURISDICTION To AVOID THE LIMITS OF
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND PROTECTIVE
JURISDICTION
Currently, successfully bringing and adjudicating claims
based on international terrorist attacks abroad remains onerous
due to the need determine which cases properly belong in U.S.
courts. The problems arise from the failure of Congress to
sufficiently match the scope of causes of action against
international terrorists to incidents of terrorism over which it
would be reasonable for the United States to claim prescriptive
jurisdiction. The mismatch occurrs because the principles of
prescriptive jurisdiction that currently exist fail to provide a
reasonable balance between the United States's security and
other nations' sovereignty.
Limits on prescriptive jurisdiction, also known as legislative
jurisdiction, play a role in both domestic and international
law. The chimerical nature of the term "jurisdiction" has
often led courts to fail to differentiate prescriptive or
legislative jurisdiction from the other types of jurisdiction-
that of adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction.6 Prescriptive
jurisdiction determines whether or not the authority purporting
to provide the rule of decision has the power to legislate over the
conduct at issue. In effect, it answers the question of whether a
law applies extraterritorially.
American law should address issues of prescriptive
jurisdiction as whether a valid claim is stated under U.S. law.
The extraterritoriality of a law goes to Congress's ability to
proscribe conduct and not to the court's competency to hear a
case. However, particularly in the antiterrorism area, courts
have mistakenly analyzed these issues under subject matter
jurisdiction.7 The difference lies in that a claim U.S. law applies
need only be nonfrivolous for a court to have subject matter
jurisdiction, even though that claim may fail to state a valid
cause of action because the U.S. lacks the prescriptive
6 CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERROR AND ANTI-TERRORISM: A NORMATIvE
AND PRACTICAL ASSESSMENT 81 (2006).
See, e.g., Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank, N.A., 256 F. Supp. 2d 158, 163
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (declaring that the court lacked "jurisdiction" to hear a RICO claim
because the statute did not apply to the conduct at issue under principles of
prescriptive jurisdiction).
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jurisdiction to apply its law. The confusion may be because the
antiterrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
which determines both immunity and subject matter jurisdiction,
happens to use the concept of passive personality-a staple of the
prescriptive jurisdiction area. This leads courts to evaluate
issues of prescriptive jurisdiction incorrectly under principles of
subject matter jurisdiction.' A more cynical explanation is that
courts construe it as subject matter jurisdiction in order to take
advantage of the greater leeway in making factual findings in
dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than
attempting to address such issues in the limited review for
failure to state a claim.
The five traditional bases for prescriptive jurisdiction
range from limiting prescriptive jurisdiction to the sovereign
territory of the state9 to universal jurisdiction for certain
strong international norms. The prescriptive reach of U.S.
antiterrorism statutes may turn out to be much more important
than the development of other procedural doctrines as the
evolving limits of extraterritorial application of laws "has been
co-extensive with social change."10 Other states may be highly
attuned to the extraterritorial reach of a country's laws, which
are regulated by international law. Like most customary
international norms, the legality of extraterritorial application of
a country's laws develops through consensus and is subject to
developing norms. How the United States defines the reach of its
antiterrorism laws will be a major factor in how terrorism and
other unconventional national security threats are addressed
under international law.
Unfortunately, the framework for justifying the exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction remains underdeveloped in domestic and
international law. Courts and scholars have, for the last
several decades, been limited to viewing the exercise of
jurisdiction within five categories: (1)territorial jurisdiction;
8 For a discussion of the importance of correctly labeling a requirement as part
of subject matter jurisdiction, see Christopher W. Robbins, Comment, Jurisdiction
and the Federal Rules: Why the Time Has Come To Reform Finality by Inequitable
Deadlines, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 287 (2008). For example, a court must recognize a
requirement of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte and can make its own factual
findings. Id. at 288.
9 BLAKESLEY, supra note 6, at 63 (noting that the territorial view governed from
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 until the early Twentieth Century).
'0 Id. at 62.
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(2) active personality, also know as nationality jurisdiction;
(3) protective jurisdiction; (4) passive personality; and
(5) universal jurisdiction.1" These categories arise from the
attempt, in 1935, by the American Society of International Law
to codify the principles of international law with regard to the
limits of prescriptive jurisdiction in criminal law. 2 This list
has become the primary reference point for determining
extraterritorial application of laws under international law,'3
even outside the U.S.'4  Called the Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime ("Draft Convention"), the epic
effort of the American Society of International Law was meant to
supplement the paucity of leading cases and international
treaties on prescriptive jurisdiction. The American Society of
International Law reviewed the national law codes of several
dozen countries in order to develop the categories.1
5
The current statutes, cases, and academic literature struggle
to fit civil litigation against terrorism into the categories of
universal jurisdiction, passive personality jurisdiction, or
protective jurisdiction. Indeed, to be successful at justifying the
U.S.'s proscription on terrorist acts abroad, one must either
distort the true scope of the U.S. antiterrorism statutes or
obfuscate the limits of the traditional jurisdictional categories.
None of the five current jurisdictional bases sufficiently supports
the current scope of civil antiterrorism legislation. Universality
fails because there is no international agreement on the meaning
1, See Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of
Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the
FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 199-201 & nn.32,
39 (1983) (describing cases from the 1960s using the five categories). Although
commonly referred to as recognizing passive personality along with its listing of the
five categories, the work of the American Society of International Law, developing
the categories, actually disclaimed passive personality's use. See infra Part I.B.3.
12 The Am. Soc'y of Int'l L., Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to
Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Draft Convention]
(naming five categories).
13 See Frank Tuerkheimer, Globalization of U.S. Law Enforcement: Does the
Constitution Come Along?, 39 HOuS. L. REV. 307, 314 (2002) ("Perhaps the most
definitive statement of jurisdiction over transnational crime was articulated in 1935
in the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime by Harvard Research
in International Law.").
" See Robert J. Currie & Stephen Coughlan, Extraterritorial Criminal
Jurisdiction: Bigger Picture or Smaller Frame?, 11 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 141, 145-48
(2007) (citing the five bases for extraterritorial application of Canadian criminal
law).
1" Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 444-45.
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of terrorism, and the current consensus on what is a prohibited
act under international law constitutes only a sliver of the
conduct covered by U.S. antiterrorism laws. Protective
jurisdiction similarly fails because the terrorist attack must be
directed against an important official government function, not
simply the nationals of the state. Passive personality, assuming
the international community did accept the principle, could
provide such a basis, but in all other substantive areas, the U.S.
objects to its use.
A. Domestic Legal Tests for Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Law: Incorporation of International Law
Under domestic U.S. law, limits on prescriptive jurisdiction
take the form of the "dual presumptions" of legislative
interpretation that, unless a contrary intent is expressly stated
or clearly implied, (1) a statute does not apply extraterritorially,'6
and (2) courts will not interpret statutes to violate the
international law of prescriptive jurisdiction. 7 The judiciary
developed these presumptions to minimize unintended clashes
between U.S. laws and foreign law and to avoid inadvertent
violation of international law.18
In domestic law, the concept of territoriality largely
coincided with American courts' views of international law limits
until the early twentieth century. Nineteenth century decisions
touted the principle that a state has power over all that occurs
within its borders but none over that which occurs outside of
them. For example, ideas of territorial-based jurisdiction were
'incorporated in personal jurisdiction limitations developed by the
Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century. 19
16 See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909) ("[Tlhe
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where it is done.").
The extraterritorial presumption has less strength in the criminal context. See
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
17 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
18 BLAKESLEY, supra note 6, at 67 (citing Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197
(1993)).
19 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720, 729-30 (1877) (citing principles of
international law in determining that a state attempting to bind a citizen in another
state through a civil judgment could not because "neither the legislative jurisdiction
nor that of courts of justice had binding force.") (internal quotation marks omitted),
overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
[Vol. 83:12011212
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Finding that the territorial view of prescriptive jurisdiction
would rob criminal prohibitions of their effectiveness in an age of
increased international travel and communication, the Supreme
Court began, in the early twentieth century, to frequently
interpret statutes as having extraterritorial application, yet
being limited by international law in the area.20 Even if a statute
applies extraterritorially, courts impose a second presumption,
called the Charming Betsy presumption,21 that Congress must
also clearly intend the statute to violate international law
regarding prescriptive jurisdiction. Thus, statutes that by clear'
implication or express legislative history apply extraterritorially
must still fit within one of the five traditional jurisdictional bases
of international law. However, if international law does not
recognize a particular prescriptive jurisdictional basis, Congress
can still write laws that apply extraterritorially provided they
state their intent clearly enough to negate the Charming Betsy
presumption.22
B. International Limits on Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Law: A Failure To Address Unconventional Security Threats
According to the 1935 Draft Convention, which continues to
hold sway with courts and scholars,23  international law
recognizes five categories of prescriptive jurisdiction with varying
degrees of international consensus supporting their legality.
Besides territorial jurisdiction, concepts of nationality, passive
personality, universality, and protective jurisdiction can arguably
provide jurisdiction.24 The last three categories, which in theory
20 See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98 (1922) (explaining that if the statute in question
is not "logically dependent on [its] locality for the government's jurisdiction," but is
enacted for the government's right to defend itself, then it is reasonable to assume
that Congress intended for the statute to apply extraterritorially); BLAKESLEY, supra
note 6, at 65-67.
22 Named for the case where it was first applied. Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
22 See Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) (noting that Congress can
pass valid statutes that violate international law).
23 See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, supra note 13, at 314; Currie & Coughlan, supra note
14, at 145-48.
24 Cf Bills To Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S.
Government Employees and Citizens Abroad: Hearings on S. 1373, S. 1429 and S.
1508 Before the S. Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 25 (1985) (statement of Raymond J. Celada, Senior Specialist
in American Public Law, Congressional Research Service) [hereinafter Prosecution
2009] 1213
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have the most potential for use with U.S. antiterrorism statutes,
do not adequately account for the reasons to apply a country's
law to unconventional national security threats.
1. Territorial Jurisdiction
International law recognizes territoriality as a justification
for prescriptive jurisdiction so long as some conduct occurred in
the state or the conduct was intended to and did have a
substantial effect within the country. These two different
methods of defining territoriality differentiate the two theories
of territorial jurisdiction: subjective and objective. Subjective
territorial jurisdiction exists when parts of the conduct have
occurred in the state wishing to apply its own laws, even if some
of the conduct may have occurred elsewhere.25 The domestic
"conduct test" reflects the subjective theory of territorial
jurisdiction.26 Objective territorial jurisdiction exists when the
effects of the conduct happen in the state that wishes to apply its
own law but the conduct or elements of the conduct occur outside
the jurisdiction.27 Domestic law adopts the objective theory of
territorial jurisdiction most prominently in the "effects test,"
which determines the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws.28 Territorial jurisdiction can provide a basis to
legislate regarding conduct when some or all of the conduct has
been completed abroad so long as there was some conduct or an
effect within the U.S.
Territorial jurisdiction's universal recognition29 makes it a
strong basis for attempting to justify the application of a state's
laws. However, particularly in the antiterrorism area, the
usefulness of its universal acceptance is offset by its narrow
scope. Because either conduct or an actual effect must occur
within the country, territorial jurisdiction does not provide a
Authorization Hearings] (noting that international law recognizes five bases of
extraterritorial application of criminal law).
25 Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli:
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 14-
15 (2007).
26 BLAKESLEY, supra note 6, at 100.
27 Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 25, at 14-15.
28 BLAKESLEY, supra note 6, at 100.
' Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 484 ("The territorial principle has not only
been universally accepted by the States, but it has had a significant development in
modern times.").
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basis for jurisdiction until an attack has already happened or
terrorists have performed acts within the U.S. This is obviously
unacceptable, as the purpose of using criminal and civil
antiterrorism laws is to prevent and deter terrorist acts in the
U.S. by detecting terrorist groups before they conduct an attack
on U.S. soil.
2. Nationality
Exercising prescriptive jurisdiction based on the conduct of a
country's own nationals represents another of the longest
recognized bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction under both
domestic30 and international law.31 However, it also represents
one of the least useful for attempting to regulate transnational
conduct like terrorism. With a few notable exceptions,32 members
of international terrorist enterprises that threaten the security
of the United States and its nationals were not born in
the United States, nor did they swear an oath of citizenship.
Thus, nationality provides an even more limited basis than
territoriality to exercise jurisdiction.
3. Passive Personality
Passive personality arguably represents a valid basis of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in both domestic and international
law for the criminal prosecution of terrorists.3  Passive
personality allows the state to regulate conduct that harms one
of its nationals.34  Thus, under the principle of passive
personality, the U.S. can regulate any conduct committed abroad
by persons who are not U.S. nationals so long as a U.S. national
is harmed. Although a few states have passed general
3o Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932); Jones v. United States,
137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
31 Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 519-20.
32 For example, one of the members of A1-Qaeda who organized the 1998
bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Wadih E1-Hage, was a
naturalized U.S. citizen. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa,
552 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2008). The most famous case is John Walker Lindh, the so-
called American Taliban, a naturally born U.S. citizen who went to Afghanistan to
join the Taliban. See United States v. Lindh, 228 F. Supp. 2d 565, 567-68 (E.D. Va.
2002).
33 BLAKESLEY, supra note 6, at 124-25 (noting that passive personality is
"gaining international recognition" but justifying current law through the protective
principle).
34 Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 25, at 13.
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extraterritorial criminal laws based on passive personality, 5
most of the activity in the area of passive personality has
generally concerned terrorism. 6
The 1935 Draft Convention of the American Society of
International Law introduced passive personality as a limitation
on universal jurisdiction and not as an independent jurisdictional
basis.37  Although the Draft Convention is often referred to as
acknowledging the principle of passive personality jurisdiction, 8
the Draft Convention only recognized its use when universal
jurisdiction would already justify the extraterritorial application
of law. 39  Thus, passive personality only served to express a
preference that the state whose nationals were injured should
assert prescriptive jurisdiction when a universally prohibited
offense was committed outside the territory of any state.40 The
drafters thought that the victim's country would be the most
likely to attempt to punish an offense even though any country
could, in theory, apply its laws to punish the offender under
universal jurisdiction.41
1 For example, France has purported to enact a criminal code protecting its
citizens abroad but has done little to attempt to enforce it. See Eric Cafritz & Omer
Tene, Article 113-7 of the French Penal Code: The Passive Personality Principle, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585 (2003) (analyzing a provision of French law providing
that " 'French criminal law is applicable to any felony, as well as to any
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment, committed by a French or foreign
national outside the territory of the French Republic, where the victim is a French
national at the time of the offense.'" (citing Code p~nal [C. pdn.] art. L.113-7 (Fr.))).
Australia has a law punishing those who murder Australian citizens or residents.
See James Cockayne, On the Cosmopolitization of Criminal Jurisdiction, 3 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 514, 519 (2005) (citing Offenses against Australians Act of 2002).
36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g (1987).
3 Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 578.
See Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 25, at 13; Ellen S. Podgor, A New
Dimension to the Prosecution of White Collar Crime: Enforcing Extraterritorial
Social Harms, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 83, 97 & n.113 (2006).
" Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 579 ("[Slince universality thus
circumscribed serves every legitimate purpose for which passive personality might
be invoked in such circumstances, it seems clear that recognition of the latter
principle in the present Convention would only invite controversy without serving
any useful objective.").
I Id. at 589 (noting that "[tihe present Convention excludes the theory of
passive personality" but in the absence of any state that would have territorial
authority and under principles of universal jurisdiction, it would be prudent to
assign the country whose national was injured the ability to apply its laws).
41 Id. at 589-90.
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The Draft Convention did not give the passive personality a
ringing endorsement by noting that both countries and scholars
differed on whether it should be a valid basis.42 Their mention of
the principle contained numerous caveats that it "has been more
strongly contested than any other type of competence," "has been
vigorously opposed in Anglo-American countries," "has had
distinguished opponents among Continental writers," and "it is
the most difficult to justify in theory."43 Hence, they did not use
it as an independent jurisdictional basis.
Passive personality continues to have the weakest
foundation in international law of the bases listed.4  The
United States itself continues adamantly to refuse to recognize
the passive personality principle outside of regulation of
international terrorist acts.45 Despite a debatable increase in its
use in terrorism and human rights statutes, 46 and a begrudging
acceptance in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law,47 the international community has not recognized passive
personality to the degree needed to justify current antiterrorism
42 Id. at 578 ("An important group of states asserts such jurisdiction; others
would contest it. Many writers favor it, while others oppose it.").
I Id. at 579.
44 See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J.
1, 13-14 (1993) ("It seems doubtful that [the] limited amount of state practice
amounts to a rule of customary international law endorsing passive personality
jurisdiction. On the other hand, it seems equally doubtful that state practice has
generated a rule of customary international law barring passive personality
jurisdiction") (emphasis in original); Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 25, at 26 ("As a
basis of jurisdiction, the passive personality principle is not widely accepted."). Other
than the ATA and FSIA exceptions, it would appear to be even rarer to use passive
personality for civil prescriptive jurisdiction.
41 See Watson, supra note 44, at 2-3 ("Many countries, including the United
States have traditionally opposed this theory of jurisdiction."); see also Joshua
Robinson, United States Practice Penalizing International Terrorists Needlessly
Undercuts Its Opposition to the Passive Personality Principle, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 487,
489-91 (1998) (summarizing history of U.S. opposition to passive personality
jurisdiction); see generally Watson, supra note 44, 4-15 & n.6 (citing legislative
statements, diplomatic protests, and a judicial opinion disapproving of other states
attempts to use passive personality, all of which range from 1887 to 1991).
' Eric Talbot Jensen, Exercising Passive Personality Jurisdiction over
Combatants: A Theory in Need of a Political Solution, 42 INT'L LAW. 1107, 1118-19
(2008) (noting that European countries appear to give the principle greater
acceptance). However, Colonel Jensen's examples of statutes and treaties regarding
genocide and torture are likely supported by universal jurisdiction, with passive
personality acting as either further jurisdictional support or as a prudential but not
legal limit on the implementation of universal principles.
47 RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 402 (1987).
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laws. For example, the Restatement limits its use to times when
a U.S. national was harmed in terrorist attack because of his or
her nationality.48 The comments to the Restatement question
whether its use is broadly supported by noting that "[tihe
[passive personality] principle has not been generally accepted
for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as
applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's
nationals by reason of their nationality, or to assassination of a
state's diplomatic representatives or other officials."49 Even this
limited statement represents an expansion of the view held by
the authors of the Restatement (Second) that passive personality
was not a legitimate basis of jurisdiction.50 In practice, the U.S.
has never limited its use of passive personality for antiterrorism
statutes to the limited basis recognized in the Restatement over
attacks on a U.S. national "by reason of' U.S. nationality.
Currently, passive personality represents the dominant
theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction relied upon by Congress in
passing the Antiterrorism Act ("ATA"), the primary civil cause
of action for terrorist activity, and the terrorism exception
abrogating foreign countries' sovereign immunity in U.S. courts. 51
Congress first incorporated passive personality into domestic
criminal antiterrorism laws as an amendment to the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986,52 where it
4 Id.
49 Id. § 402 cmt. g (emphasis added). Even this comment may overstate the
acceptance of the principle, as a key piece of support for the proposition was the
passage of criminal regulation by the U.S. Congress against terrorist acts committed
against U.S. nationals. See id. § 402 reporter's note 3 (citing Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399). Congress may have
relied upon the draft version of the Restatement (Third), which stated that some
countries used passive personality jurisdiction over terrorism acts without citation
to pass the Antiterrorism Act of 1986. Prosecution Authorization Hearings, supra
note 24, at 28 (1985) (statement of Raymond J. Celada, Senior Specialist in
American Public Law, Congressional Research Service (citing Restatement, Foreign
Relations Tentative Draft No. 6 § 402 cmt. g (1985))).
50 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 30(2) (1965) ("A
state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that
the conduct affects one of its nationals.").
51 See infra Part II.B.2.
52 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act § 1202; United States v.
Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 902-03 (D.D.C. 1988), affd, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(justifying the Act on passive personality and universal jurisdiction grounds but
rejecting that protective jurisdiction would allow for extraterritorial application of
the law). But see BLAKESLEY, supra note 6, at 124-25, 139 (arguing that the
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extended the criminal prohibition on extraterritorial killing of
certain high-ranking U.S. officials to all U.S. citizens killed
by acts of international terrorism abroad.53  Despite some
arguments that such statutes relied on "protective jurisdiction"
and not passive personality,54 the Conference Report made clear
that prosecutors need not prove that the attackers intended to
kill a U.S. national, only that a U.S. national was murdered.5
This mirrored the most pervasive understanding of passive
personality, that the injury to a national justifies prescriptive
jurisdiction.
U.S. antiterrorism laws have few limits on the principle
other than that it only applies in instances of a terrorist
attack. Congress did limit the provision to avoid prosecution of
"[s]imple barroom brawls or normal street crime" by requiring
the Attorney General to certify that the act was intended to
"coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or civilian
population" in order for criminal prosecution to proceed.5" That a
terrorist act may be intended to coerce other countries and not
protective principle was the jurisdictional basis because it is limited to terrorist acts,
which appear to be intended to coerce civilian populations or government policy). It
remains questionable if an attack on a U.S. national represents the threat to the
important governmental function required for application of protective jurisdiction.
See id. at 115 n.224 (collecting cases that recognize the existence of the protective
principle but limit its application to acts "directly injurious to the government" such
as counterfeiting).
53 See H.R. REP. No. 99-783, at 87 (1986) (Conf. Rep.) (adopting Senate proposal
to extend criminal prohibitions to murders of U.S. citizens abroad during terrorists
acts). Senator Specter, in introducing the bill, called the jurisdictional principle the
"protective principle." 132 Cong. Rec. 2356 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Specter).
However, the basis is properly passive personality, despite Congress having a habit
of invoking protective jurisdiction. See Watson, supra note 44, at 31 ("[Congress] has
adopted several anti-terrorism statutes founded at least partly on passive
personality jurisdiction, though it prefers to call this legislation an exercise of
protective jurisdiction.").
' Prosecution Authorization Hearings, supra note 24, at 22-23 (statement of
Raymond J. Celada, Senior Specialist in American Public Law, Congressional
Research Service) (noting that both protective jurisdiction and passive personality
would support exercising criminal jurisdiction over attacks that injure American
officials abroad); Watson, supra note 44, at 9 (noting that statutes penalizing crimes
against American officials and diplomats abroad "can be understood as examples of
the protective principle of jurisdiction rather than the passive personality
principle").
- See H.R. REP. No. 99-783, at 87 ("As in the Senate amendment, there is no
requirement that the U.S. Government prove during the criminal prosecution the
purpose of the murder.").
56 See id.
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the American government or American civilian population is
irrelevant. Congress later used the criminal provisions as a basis
for civil liability in the ATA, while retaining passive personality
as the theory for the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws."
In contrast to the in-depth examination of the principles of
extraterritorial application of law when it passed the criminal
antiterrorism provisions in 1986,8 Congress assumed with little
discussion that the same jurisdictional bases would serve its
purpose in passing the civil ATA.59
The current system of allowing civil suits for terrorist
acts abroad arguably pushes beyond the extent that passive
personality allows extraterritorial application of U.S.' laws. 60
Many members of Congress considered the regulation of
attacks injuring American nationals to be permissible under
international law.6 1 However, the Restatement requires that the
attack be directed at U.S. nationals, while Congress specifically
disclaimed any such limitation.2 The U.S.'s recognition of the
" See H.R. REP. No. 102-1040, at 5 (1992) ("The Congress in 1986 passed
criminal legislation, the so-called 'long-arm' statute, which provides extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction for acts of international terrorism against U.S. nationals. The
Committee believes that there is a need for a companion civil legal cause of action
for American victims of terrorism.") (internal citation omitted).
' Prosecution Authorization Hearings, supra note 24, at 31 (statement of Sen.
McConnell) ("I have concern that the bill, S. 1373, seeks to exert extraterritorial
jurisdiction in a novel and perhaps unconstitutional manner."); id. at 33 (statement
of Sen. Specter) (declaring version of bill "will in no way contravene or conflict with
either international or constitutional law."); id. at 36 (statement of Sen. Specter)
(noting that "international law... recognizes broad criminal jurisdiction" (emphasis
added))); id. at 68 (statement of Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, U.S.
Department of State) (supporting the bill but noting that "[e]ven though some States
may extend their criminal jurisdiction generally to serious crimes against their
nationals abroad, any such extension should be implemented cautiously").
"' See Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465 Before the S. Subcomm. on
Courts and Administrative Practice of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 101st Cong.
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 ATA Hearing] (containing no discussion of alternative bases
for extraterritorial reach of the ATA).
60 The legal analysis requested by Congress with respect to proposed criminal
regulation in 1986 discussed two competing provisions: one covering only injury to
U.S. officials and the other applying to injuries to U.S. nationals. The legal analysis
found the first provision supported by protective and passive personality jurisdiction
but found that the second provision encompassing all U.S. nationals "seems to
implicate the universality principle of jurisdiction." Prosecution Authorization
Hearings, supra note 24, at 23 (1985) (statement of Raymond J. Celada, Senior
Specialist in American Public Law, Congressional Research Service).
61 See supra, note 58 (Sen. Spector's remarks).
62 See supra, note 55.
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principle for only antiterrorism legislation further undercuts the
proposition that passive personality provides an appropriate
jurisdictional basis.
4. Universal Jurisdiction
Much of the recent scholarship has focused on the
universality of prohibitions on terror.63 Universal jurisdiction
allows prosecution of acts that constitute jus cogens violations of
international law.64 Jus cogens norms are preemptory norms so
fundamental to international law that no country can refuse to
enforce or obey them.65  Universal jurisdiction encourages
enforcement of these prohibitions because any state attempting
to enforce the prohibition can apply its own law without concern
about whether the site of the incident had a similar law.
Recognizing a basis for all states to apply their own laws
prevents a single country's or a small group of states' failure to
prohibit the conduct from thwarting the prosecution of certain
crimes.
Universal jurisdiction, although highly controversial in the
early 20th Century,66 has begun to gain acceptance. However,
despite the hopes of some, the claim that there is "universal
jurisdiction" for civil litigation against terrorists remains
questionable.6 Indeed, all of the terrorism-specific causes of
action under U.S. law rely on less than universal jurisdiction.
Instead, the terrorism-specific statutes use either passive
personality or territorial jurisdiction.68
' See Kenneth C. Randall, Special U.S. Civil Jurisdiction, in LEGAL RESPONSES
TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 89, 103-104 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed. 1988); BLAKESLEY, supra note 6, at 132-33 (stating sources "when
considered as a whole, make it clear that terrorism-including hostage taking,
kidnapping, intentional or wanton violence against innocent civilians-is often
really a composite term that includes, or could be, any one of several separate
universally condemned offenses"); John F. Murphy, Civil Lawsuits as a Legal
Response to International Terrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM,
103-04 (John Norton Moore ed., 2004).
6 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).
6 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004).
1 See, e.g., Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 445.
61 See John Norton Moore, Introduction to CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST
TERRORISM, supra note 63, at 3, 5 ("[Tlerrorist attacks are not gray area human
activities, but rather are activities that are clearly viewed as criminal in every legal
system and are even criminalized in the major United Nations sponsored
antiterrorism conventions embodying community consensus against such acts.").
6' See infra Part II.
2009] 1221
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
One could also argue that, given a stated desire to establish
a universal prohibition on terrorist attacks, members of Congress
believed there to be no limitation under international law
because of principles of universal jurisdiction. Congress may
have then limited such causes of action to attacks injuring U.S.
nationals as a pragmatic, but not legal, limit on which cases the
U.S forum should hear,69 similar to how the Draft Convention
used the doctrine.
However, universal jurisdiction, if it exists for terrorist acts
at all, exists only for certain acts prohibited by widely ratified
international treaties. International law would not recognize
universal prescriptive jurisdiction reaching terrorism as defined
by domestic law under the ATA and similar statutes. The
drafters of the criminal extraterritorial antiterrorism provisions
were aware that customary international law did not provide
universal jurisdiction over terrorist acts due to the failure
to define terrorism in a manner that other countries would
find acceptable.7 °  The proponents seemed to be acting in
the hope that U.S. antiterrorism laws would spur stalled
attempts to create an international framework providing
universal jurisdiction,71  while settling on using passive
" See K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and Structural Reasonableness, 40
TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 42-43 (2004) (noting that several doctrines limit the role of U.S.
courts in hearing cases where universal jurisdiction exists because the existence of
jurisdiction does not necessarily support the prudence of exercising jurisdiction).
70 See Prosecution Authorization Hearings, supra note 24, at 29 (statement of
Raymond J. Celada, Senior Specialist in American Public Law, Congressional
Research Service) (noting that universal jurisdiction over terrorist acts is difficult to
establish because a uniform definition is lacking and noting that the Convention to
Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons
and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, opened for signature
Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 1438 U.N.T.S. 194, only had seven parties, including
the United States). The difficulties of creating a general antiterrorism treaty were
due to the fact that "there is little agreement regarding what constitutes terrorism
and this militates against asserted 'universality.'" Id. The statute has gained some
acceptance since then, currently having thirteen Organization of American States
("OAS") members as parties to the treaty. See OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT LEGAL
ADVISOR FOR TREATY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 178 (2009).
71 131 CONG. REC. 18871 (1985) (statement of Sen. Specter) (noting that a
resolution was introduced concurrent with the criminal antiterrorism legislation,
"call[ing] for international negotiations aimed at determining an international
definition of terrorism which could then be established as a 'universal crime,' like
piracy, punishable by any nation that captures the terrorists"); Prosecution
Authorization Hearings, supra note 24, at 83 (prepared statement of Hon. Robert B.
Oakley, Director, Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, U.S.
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personality as the interim basis for legislating extraterritorially.
Despite these hopes, the attempts to define and prohibit
terrorism in the intervening years have not proved any more
successful in forming a general prohibition.72
The potential criminal violations that give rise to universal
criminal jurisdiction have expanded in recent years but remain
much more limited than the conduct that the United States
purports to regulate.73 The potential civil causes of action remain
even more limited.74 Universal jurisdiction remains unavailable
to justify the broad U.S. civil antiterrorism laws.
5. Protective Jurisdiction
Protective jurisdiction effectively expands the objective
territoriality theory to include conduct where a perpetrator
intends the activity to have a specific effect in the country
wishing to apply its law.75 Unlike objective territoriality, the
effect does not have to occur.76 Thus, the intent to disrupt
important government functions can trigger action by the
Department of State) (noting that "the legislation is a useful step in developing an
international legal framework against terrorism").
72 See Murphy, supra note 63, at 37-41 & n.5 (noting that all definitions of
terrorism have failed to gain international acceptance, except a definition of
international definition of terrorism as the "ad hoc" incorporation of the individual
antiterror treaties).
73 The Restatement lists them as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987). It disclaims a general terrorism
prohibition. Id. cmt. a ("There has been wide condemnation of terrorism but
international agreements to punish it have not, as of 1987, been widely adhered to,
principally because of inability to agree on a definition of the offense.").
74 The principle of universality need not be limited to criminal jurisdiction, but it
has gained little traction for recognizing civil causes of action. Id. § 404 cmt. b ("In
general, jurisdiction on the basis of universal interests has been exercised in the
form of criminal law, but international law does not preclude the application of non-
criminal law on this basis.... ."). Recognition of a civil cause of action for torture has
been aided by the Convention Against Torture. Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 14, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1031 ("Each State Party shall
ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has
an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as
full rehabilitation as possible."). The Restatement recognizes that piracy has
traditionally also been allowed as an international tort. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 cmt. b.
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. f ("The
protective principle may be seen as a special application of the effects
principle[.] ... [I]t has been treated as an independent basis of jurisdiction.").
76 Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 25, at 22.
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targeted state. For example, a conspiracy to assassinate a high
official would justify exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction as soon
as the perpetrators' intent is formed, well before any effects on
the state attempting to exercise jurisdiction occur.
Similar to the mention of passive personality, the American
Society of International Law, by recognizing protective
jurisdiction in the Draft Convention, tried to synthesize different
approaches. The recognition of protective jurisdiction at that
time was meant "not as a restatement of existing practice, but as
a means of attaining a reasonable compromise."77 While other
states may have recognized broader jurisdiction over intended
attacks on their national security, the United States and Great
Britain limited the principle to inference with their "public
agencies and instrumentalities."7  Domestic courts continue to
interpret the protective principle to require that the conduct's
effect must "threaten[] the integrity of governmental functions
that are generally recognized as crimes by developed legal
systems."79 This category traditionally included counterfeiting,
falsification of official documents, perjury before consular
officials, and conspiracy to violate immigration or customs laws.80
While this basis may be useful in situations such as the 1998
terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies abroad,"' it does not apply to
intended attacks against strictly civilian targets. Under the
U.S.'s interpretation of the protective principle, an intended
terrorist attack does not give rise to jurisdiction unless the
attacks were intended to disrupt governmental functions.
Despite some discussion that Congress legislated under this
principle in the ATA, 2 nowhere did members of Congress
attempt to address how their "protective jurisdiction" based on
the civilian victim's status as a U.S. national differed from
7' Draft Convention, supra note 12, at 557.
78 Id. at 544.
79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. f.
I0 Id. The limited category of such crimes may have been why Congress
ultimately settled on wording the criminal antiterrorism provisions of the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 in terms of passive personality
instead of the protective principle. See Prosecution Authorization Hearings, supra
note 24, at 27 (statement of Raymond J. Celada, Senior Specialist in American
Public Law, Congressional Research Service) (noting that "it is doubtful that [the
protective principle] would sustain a law aimed at violence directed at U.S. citizens
or nationals of the United State as such").
I1 See Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 13-14 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
82 See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
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passive personality. Additionally, the legislative history failed to
adequately address the concerns raised in submissions to
Congress that protective jurisdiction only applied to attacks
intended to disrupt important governmental functions8 3 and has
not traditionally applied to attacks merely against ordinary
citizens and nationals of a country.
C. Limitations of the Current Prescriptive Jurisdictional Bases:
Why Terrorism Challenges the Five Traditional Categories
The current jurisdictional categories inadequately address
uncoventional security threats like terrorism. The framework
has two large problems, which this Section addresses. First,
passive personality remains a very controversial and inadequate
basis for jurisdiction. Passive personality has no clear limit and
could offend principles of fairness inherent in an effective legal
system. Second, without passive personality, the remaining
jurisdictional categories do not provide a viable basis for
regulating unconventional threats. No adequate intermediate
step exists between universal jurisdiction and the protective
principle. Unconventional threats such as terrorism do not
target the important governmental functions required for
protective jurisdiction, nor do they easily give rise to the
consensus needed to form a jus cogens norm for universal
jurisdiction. Thus, courts and Congress have been forced
to distort the jurisdictional bases to justify antiterrorism
legislation.
1. Passive Personality: An Inadequate Principle
Antiterrorism laws are sui generis in U.S. law because of the
recognition of passive personality jurisdiction84 The United
States has repeatedly objected to its use in other areas, 5 which
may be why members of Congress, in a bit of imprecise
terminology, referred to the antiterrorism laws of 1986 and 1990
m See supra note 80.
' See Watson, supra note 44, at 11 ("Outside of terrorism, however, the United
States still seems reluctant to embrace passive personality jurisdiction. Although
Congress has recognized passive personality jurisdiction for some terrorist offenses,
it has not extended such jurisdiction to common crimes of violence against
Americans on foreign soil."); see also Robinson, supra note 45, at 488-91
(summarizing history of U.S. opposition to passive personality jurisdiction).
85 See Watson, supra note 44, at 11-12; see also Robinson, supra note 45, at 488-
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as passed under "protective jurisdiction." Despite the
convenience of passing the antiterrorism laws by using passive
personality, the United States's prior position in opposing passive
personality jurisdiction may in fact be the correct position as a
matter of international law, foreign policy, and national security.
General criticisms of passive personality have been
threefold: first, many critics argue that it intrudes on the
sovereignty of foreign states; second, it deprives defendants of
notice of what law will be applied to their conduct; and third,
it is impractical, as fighting terrorism requires cooperation
from states that will be unlikely to cooperate unless they also
recognize passive personality as a valid basis. 6 Many other
states generally prefer to enforce their laws through means other
than civil litigation and large jury awards and may be resistant
to broad bases of civil extraterritorial jurisdiction such as passive
personality.8 7
With regard to sovereignty, the argument against passive
personality jurisdiction has been that it constitutes a significant
intrusion into the sovereign domain of other nations without
providing a corresponding benefit to the state attempting to
apply its law extraterritorially.88 Arguably, the state wishing to
apply its law has an interest in protecting its nationals abroad.
However, passive personality fails to protect this interest because
defendants need not be aware of the victim's nationality.8 9 The
threat of sanctions by the state where the act is committed likely
provides much greater deterrence than the threat of another
state, whose laws will only apply if its nationals are (possibly
unintentionally) injured."
The importance of cooperation to combat terrorists who
oppose the United States makes the problem of offending other
countries' sovereignty particularly acute. If the U.S. wishes to
use criminal prosecutions and civil litigation to both punish
86 See Watson, supra note 44, at 14-15 (listing criticisms).
87 See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION
IN UNITED STATES COURTS 648-49 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that other countries have
objected to the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws due to treble
damage provisions and the fact that private plaintiffs can initiate suit).
See Watson, supra note 44, at 16-19.
89 See id. at 18-19 (stating that although passive personality jurisdiction may
provide some protection to a state's nationals abroad, this protection is likely limited
by the uncertain deterent effect of such a law).
o See id.
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terrorists and gather information on terrorism activities in
other countries, a narrower focus can be more beneficial. Other
countries may be less receptive to entries by the U.S. and its
courts in extradition, aid for discovery, and enforcement of
judgments if these other states are not assured that the incident
being addressed directly threatens U.S. national security
interests.
Relatedly, the potential terrorists of the world cannot be sure
which country's law would apply unless they are aware of the
nationality of their potential victims. Occasions where
Americans are killed incident to a terrorist act in a foreign
country's domestic conflict present the greatest concern about
unfair application of U.S. law. The unfairness could potentially
rise to the level of a due process violation.91 In Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,92 the Supreme Court found that applying
the forum state's law to out-of-state transactions violated due
process constraints unless the law applied to the case had
sufficient connections to the conduct to be nonarbitrary. One
may argue that an international terrorist risks injuring U.S.
citizens simply by undertaking terrorist activity, and thus
similar to one who injures the eggshell plaintiff, she cannot
complain of the application of U.S. law. However, if one were to
change the hypothetical to an interstate car accident, it seems
that allowing New York law to govern a claim against a
California driver for an accident in California simply because the
plaintiff is a citizen of New York would raise serious due process
concerns. 94 What if it were a French driver, hit in New York,
trying to sue under French law?
Thus, the argument that passive personality does not
offend principles of notice seemingly relies on the gravity
of the prohibited conduct. A state cannot apply its law
91 Assuming, of course, that the purported terrorist had sufficient due process
rights in this situation to raise a due process violation.
92 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985).
93 See Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000)
(arguing that state sponsors of terror cannot object to the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over them because engaging in this prohibited conduct risks the injury
of nationals of that state).
" The Due Process Clause has been found to limit a state's ability to regulate
contracts operative wholly outside its territory simply because one party was a state
citizen. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143,
149 (1934).
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extraterritorially to activity less morally repugnant than
terrorism based on passive personality. This raises a serious
question about whether the U.S. should sanction passive
personality as a loosening of the pervasiveness required to give
rise to universal jurisdiction. Once the issues of notice are
examined, it becomes clear that the use of passive personality for
terrorism requires viewing it as more unacceptable than other
conduct, while trying to avoid the commonality of the prohibition
that exercise of universal jurisdiction requires.
Lastly, passive personality remains controversial because
other countries must accept the principle's validity before a
successful prosecution or lawsuit can occur. For criminal
prosecutions, states asserting passive personality may often find
that the other state would refuse to extradite because of the weak
relationship between the incident and the state attempting to
apply its laws.95 For civil cases, this may take the form of the
state refusing to recognize or enforce judgments based on passive
personality. A further complication will be the collection of
evidence. Because the terrorist attacks at the focus of the
prosecution or lawsuit will have occurred abroad, foreign
governments that do not recognize passive personality may
refuse to assist the U.S. or civil litigants in needed discovery. 96
Adopting a narrower basis can assure other countries that the
U.S. has a strong interest in applying its own law.
2. United States v. Yunis: How Congress and the Courts Added
Universal Jurisdiction to Passive Personality To Get
Antiterrorism Law
The limitations on protective jurisdiction and the difficulty
in showing the consensus of need for universal jurisdiction have
forced the courts and Congress to adopt passive personality as a
half-step to universal jurisdiction and a half-step from protective
jurisdiction. The case of United States v. Yunis97 highlights the
difficulties in finding an appropriate jurisdictional basis.
In one of the earliest domestic counterterrorism cases, the
federal judiciary recognized the limited usefulness of the
protective principle-something Congress later ignored. In
Yunis, the government prosecuted Fawaz Yunis for the hijacking
9 See Watson, supra note 44, at 24-26 & n.118.
See id. at 29.
9, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), affd, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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of a Jordanian Airliner in the Middle East.9 Judge Parker
evaluated whether the Charming Betsy presumption that
Congress does not violate international law without a clear
statement of its intent required limiting the scope of a statute
criminalizing airplane hijacking. 99 Judge Parker found that
theories of universal jurisdiction and passive personality
jurisdiction supported the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antiterrorism law but that protective jurisdiction did not.'00 The
reason for refusing to apply protective jurisdiction was that an
attack on a private airliner does not intend to disrupt important
governmental functions.' 1 The case highlights both the limited
nature of the protective principle and that justifying the U.S.'s
antiterrorism statutes requires mashing together universal
jurisdiction and passive personality.
Arguably, Judge Parker rightly finds that the universality
principle supports jurisdiction for this particular act because
the widely accepted airplane hijacking convention, implicated in
that case, reflects a global norm of definite content. 10 2 However,
without the convention, universal jurisdiction would not allow for
the prosecution, as there is no general antiterrorism customary
international law.
Judge Parker went on to find that passive personality also
supports jurisdiction over terrorist acts.' Noting that the
Restatement allows for jurisdiction based on a state's nationals
being targeted due to their nationality, Judge Parker dismissed
any general concern over passive personality's validity because
"qualified application of the doctrine to serious and universally
condemned crimes will not raise the specter of unlimited and
unexpected criminal liability."'0 4 Judge Parker used recognition
of jurisdiction when nationals of a country are targeted
because of their nationality, while also relying on universal
Id. at 898.
See id. at 899.
o Id. at 903 & n14.
10 See id.
.02 See id. at 901; see also Adam W. Wegner, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under
International Law: The Yunis Decision as a Model for the Prosecution of Terrorists in
U.S. Courts, 22 LAw & POL'Y INTVL Bus. 409, 420-25 & 438 (1991) (praising the
decision's offense-specific analysis of international law with respect to universal
jurisdiction).
103 Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 902.
104 Id.
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condemnation-the focus of universal jurisdiction-to justify
passive personality jurisdiction for all attacks injuring U.S.
nationals, regardless of the intent of the attacker. 10 Much like
Congress has done, the Yunis decision hastily adds the limited
cases where a widely ratified international treaty addresses
terrorist activity to the cases where U.S. nationals are targeted
due to their nationality to justify the application of U.S. law to all
types of terrorist attacks injuring U.S. nationals, a sum much
greater than its two purported parts. The Yunis decision is an
example of the use of the broad definition of passive personality
in U.S. antiterrorism law that failed to treat passive personality
as more than a half-step to universal jurisdiction.
II. SUING TERRORISTS IN U.S. COURTS: OVERLY BROAD
SUBSTANTIVE LAW TEMPERED BY UNDULY
RESTRICTIVE PROCEDURES
The lack of a suitable basis of prescriptive jurisdiction for
unconventional security threats is an acute problem for both civil
and criminal U.S. antiterrorism statutes. However, the civil
provisions of antiterrorism laws present greater problems than
the criminal provisions. The use of passive personality results in
overly broad substantive law, which courts then attempt to
temper by the use of procedural doctrines. These doctrines
are not a factor in criminal prosecutions. Thus, some civil suits
furthering U.S. interests are dismissed. Unlike criminal
prosecutions, no limited group of governmental actors can
10I Others have similarly tried to justify the use of passive personality by trying
to attach it to a general acceptance that terrorist acts are the proper subject of
greater extraterritorial regulations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g (1987) (allowing passive personality only for terrorism);
John G. McCarthy, Note, The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use in
Combatting International Terrorism, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 298, 318-21 (1990)
(adopting Restatement approach in arguing that a consensus should be formed that
passive personality can be used for terrorist attacks that target a country's
nationals). The problem with such views is that once a consensus that terrorism can
and should be punished exists, the concept of universal jurisdiction provides the
justification, not passive personality. Passive personality at most acts as a proviso
limiting universal jurisdiction, similar to how the Draft Convention used the idea.
See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. Such proposals fail because the
consensus against all but a few types of terrorism is not strong enough to allow for
universal jurisdiction, and thus the justification for allowing the application of the
principle only for terrorism is severely weakened.
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exercises discretion in a organized manner to match prosecutions
to cases where the U.S. has security interests. This means that
many civil suits can proceed that lack a U.S. interest, while
others involving U.S. interests are unsuccessful.
A. Causes of Action: A Patchwork of Authorizations To Sue
Terrorists
Civil litigation over terrorist acts has attracted a lot of
attention lately. 10 6 But, the movement to impose civil liability for
acts of international terrorism began well before terrorism
became one of the foremost national security issues of the United
States. 107  The first civil antiterrorism statutes began with
Congress allowing victims of specific international incidents
to seek compensation. 0 8  However, unless Congress had passed
an incident-specific act, victims often found it difficult to
successfully recover. The divergent results of suits for
international acts of terrorism in the 1980s motivated Congress
to pass general civil antiterrorism legislation. Prior to the
passage of the Antiterrorism Act of 1990, plaintiffs in civil
lawsuits for acts of international terrorism faced difficulties due
to the lack of a terrorism-specific cause of action, which Congress
remedied with the passage of the Antiterrorism Act.
1. Terrorism Becomes a Tort: The Antiterrorism Act
The Antiterrorism Act of 1990 provides the broadest cause of
action against international terrorists. Plaintiffs have attempted
to use the ATA for acts including the September 11 attacks,' 9
106 See generally CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM supra note 63.
107 However, it did not predate the idea of a "War on Terror." The sponsor of one
of the major civil terrorism litigation bills called the struggle "the war against
terrorism." See 1990 ATA Hearing, supra note 57, at 54 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
108 See Jennifer A. Rosenfeld, Note, The Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Bringing
International Terrorists to Justice the American Way, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J.
726, 732-35 (1992) ("Historically, American victims of terrorist acts abroad had been
legally defenseless unless they were designated as compensable victims under relief
statutes covering the specific terrorist incident."). The most notable instance was the
Hostage Relief Act of 1980, which allowed compensation to those held hostage at the
American Embassy during the Iranian Revolution. Id. at 732 n.21.
109 See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 836-37
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), affd, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009)
(denying motions to dismiss ATA claims against charities that allegedly funded al-
Qaeda); accord Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 105, 107
(D.D.C. 2003). Note, however, that the September 11 plaintiffs have faced challenges
in establishing an exception to sovereign immunity and establishing personal
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attacks by Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization
("PLO") in Israeli territory,"' bombing of U.S. embassies, 1 ' and
attacks on U.S. military personnel by al-Qaeda abroad. 112
The ATA allows recovery of treble damages for any act of
international terrorism that injures a U.S. national's person,
property, or business." Property damage is only actionable if it
is against property of the U.S. government or its agency or
department.14  Activities must meet three requirements to be
considered acts of international terrorism.
First, the activities must involve violent or dangerous acts
that are or would be criminal under any federal criminal law or
law of a state if that terrorist act had theoretically been
committed in the United States or any state of the union." 5 Due
to the range of federal and state criminal law, the first
requirement of the ATA could likely be satisfied by almost any
violent or dangerous act.
Secondly, the acts must "appear to be intended" to intimidate
or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the
of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping. 116 This relevant population or government can be
any government or population and not just that of the U.S. In
jurisdiction over the defendants. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538
F.3d at 95-96 (finding that many defendants were either immune or not subject to
personal jurisdiction).
11 See Ungar v. Palestinian Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274, 276 (1st Cir. 2005)
(evaluating claims that the ATA applied to attacks by Hamas gunman on Israeli
cars killing an American national); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000,
1001-02 (7th Cir. 2002) (evaluating claims that Hamas gunman shot an American
student studying in Israel as he waited for the bus); Knox v. Palestinian Liberation
Org., 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
"I See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 102
(2d Cir. 2008); Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (hearing claim
against Osama bin Laden for bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania).
112 See Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1326 (D. Utah 2006) (evaluating
claim against al-Qaeda member who committed a terrorist act against U.S. soldiers
in Afghanistan); Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229,
265 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding Iran liable for attacks on Khobar Towers in Saudi
Arabia).
113 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006).
14 Id. § 2332b(b)(1)(D).
1 Id. § 2331(1)(A).
116 Id. § 2331(1)(B).
[Vol. 83:12011232
FINDING TERRORISTS' INTENT
contrast, the proposed intent-based framework would limit the
terrorist acts giving rise to a claim under U.S. law to those
intended to harm the U.S. or its nationals.
Lastly, to differentiate it from domestic terrorism, the
activities must either occur primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States or transcend national
boundaries due to the means used, people targeted, or locale the
actors operated within."7
The scope of liability does not include some secondary
conduct, such as aiding and abetting, unless it also qualifies as
lending "material support" to terrorists, a primary offense under
the ATA. The few courts that have addressed whether the ATA
applies to the conduct of lending material support found that
liability can be imposed provided that each element is satisfied
for the conduct at issue. 118 These same courts held that the
ATA does not allow for "secondary liability" such as aiding
and abetting or conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism." 9
However, traditional aiding and abetting-type conduct can
constitute materially supporting terrorist activity in certain
circumstances. 2 o
a. The Antiterrorism Act's Goals: Balancing Counterterrorism
and Compensation
Congress created the ATA in response to several high profile
cases, where plaintiffs' recovery seemed doubtful: the hijacking of
the Achille Lauro and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.2' In
1985, members of the Palestine Liberation Organization hijacked
the cruise ship Achille Lauro.122  During the hijacking, PLO
117 Id. § 2331(1)(C).
118 See Jack Goldsmith & Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and
International Terrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 63, at
109, 121-22. The leading case on the issue found that material support with intent
could be a basis for liability under the ATA but that funding simpliciter did not
support liability. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1012, 1024 (7th Cir.
2002).
119 Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir.
2008).
120 Id. at 692.
121 1990 ATA Hearing, supra note 57, at 2-3 (1990) (statement of Sen. Grassley)
(noting that successes of prior plaintiffs such as those in the two incidents were "not
definitive" and that the ATA "empowers the victims of terrorism to seek justice").
12 Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille
Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991).
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members shot the wheelchair-bound Leon Klinghoffer, a Jewish
American, and threw his body overboard. 123 Klinghoffer's heirs
successfully sued the PLO in federal court despite uncertainty
over the propriety of applying U.S. tort principles to
extraterritorial acts of terrorism. 124
In contrast, the family members of the victims from the
bombing of Flight 103 had little success in bringing suit against
the perpetrators of the bombing before the passage of the ATA.
Following the bombing, the victims received a settlement offer
from Pan Am for compensation and received interest from
attorneys willing to sue Pan Am or the U.S. Government. 125
However, they were unable to find any attorneys or donors
willing to fund an investigation into the source of the attack or
willing to sue the perpetrators of the bombing. 26 The families of
the victims of Flight 103 pushed for the ATA's passage in order to
clearly establish an avenue of legal action for the families against
those who actually committed the bombing. 127
The main purposes of the ATA were to compensate victims
and supplement criminal enforcement when the alleged terrorist
could not be brought into court to face criminal charges. 2  The
ATA's sponsors intended to do this by "remov[ing] the
jurisdictional hurdles in the courts confronting victims and
[empowering] victims with all the weapons available in civil
litigation."29 Congress first passed the Act so that "American
civil law would be granted the same extra-territorial reach as
American criminal law," which reached any international
terrorist act that injured a U.S. national.130  The legislative
history of the bill casts this supplementation of the criminal
statutes as driven by both a desire to compensate victims 13' and a
wish to supplement criminal charges in a comprehensive
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 ALLAN GERSON & JERRY ADLER, THE PRICE OF TERROR 47 (2001).
126 Id.
127 See 1990 ATA Hearing, supra note 57, at 70-71 (statement of Paul S.
Hudson, Chairman, Families of Pan Am 103/Lockerbie).
128 138 Cong. Rec. 33628-29 (1992) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
129 137 Cong. Rec. 8143 (1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
130 H.R. REP. No. 102-1040, at 5 (1992).
1.1 See 1990 ATA Hearing, supra note 57, at 12 (statement of Alan J. Kreczko,
Deputy Legal Advisor, Dep't of State) ("While we have made a start in prosecuting
the perpetrators of terrorist acts, it is still unfortunately the case that victims of
terrorism generally remain uncompensated.").
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antiterrorism strategy.'32 At the time the ATA was passed,
Congress was aware of the limits of the criminal justice system to
combat terrorism because of the difficulty in capturing or
extraditing terrorists, 133 the higher standard of proof required for
a criminal conviction, 34 and the failures of the law enforcement
agencies to adequately respond to acts of international
terrorism. 135  Congressional hearings highlighted the fact that
the Klinghoffer case had resulted in the deposition of a high-
ranking PLO member. 136  This deposition brought to light
startling information on the PLO's activity in the U.S., of which
the government had not been previously aware. 37  Thus,
Congress contemplated the idea of using civil litigation as a
national security tool when it considered the ATA, even though
compensation was probably a more prominent reason for
enacting the legislation.
b. Drawing the Extraterritorial Line: Securing Nationals as
National Security
Contrary to the current tendency to view the "War on
Terror" as beginning on September 11, in the late 1980s and
1990s, Congress wished to establish a legal regime outlawing
132 See id. ("The existence of such cause of action may deter terrorist groups from
maintaining assets in the United States... and from soliciting funds from within
the United States.").
... See id. (statement of Steven R. Valentine, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil
Div.) (noting that the perpetrators of an airline hijacking that resulted in the death
of a Navy serviceman were still at large, except for one potential defendant, who
West Germany had refused to extradite, while the Italian government refused to
extradite the hijackers of the Achile Lauro).
134 See id. at 18 (statement of Alan J. Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor,
Department of State) ("[Tihe bill may be useful in situations in which the rules of
evidence or standards of proof preclude the U.S. government from effectively
prosecuting a criminal case in U.S. Courts.").
135 One year before passage of the ATA, Congress held hearings on the
mysterious plane crash that killed the Pakistani President Zia-Ul-Haq and U.S.
Ambassador to Pakistan. See Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Terrorists Acts
Abroad: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 1-4 (1989) (statements of Rep. Hughes and Rep. McCollum). The
hearings addressed the failure of the U.S. to investigate the crash, which was
partially due to State Department officials ordering the FBI not to enter Pakistan.
Id. at 3-4.
136 See 1990 ATA Hearing, supra note 57, at 50-51 (question of Sen. Grassley to
John De Pue, Counselor to the Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div.) (noting
that the deposition was a key piece of evidence to which De Pue replied was found
independently).
137 Id. at 50.
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terrorist acts similar to customary international law's prohibition
on piracy. The ATA represents Congress's first attempt towards
establishing such a regime regarding civil liability, which gained
little traction internationally due to the failure of the
international community to agree on what conduct constitutes
"terrorism." The broad scope of the ATA appears to be
unsustainable in light of the failure to create an international
antiterrorism norm.
In presenting the ATA, its sponsors conflated attacks that
injured American nationals and those directed at American
nationals."8  The distinction lies at the heart of the
extraterritorial application of the ATA. The language of the
statute reflects a broader application of U.S. law to all terrorist
attacks that injure U.S. nationals, while the legislative history of
the bill mentions a desire to prevent attacks directed at U.S.
nationals by use of "protective jurisdiction."" 9 As shown above,
protective jurisdiction requires intent to impair an important
government function. 140  This is a requirement the language of
the ATA lacks. In further support of a broader reading of the
ATA's extraterritoriality, proponents claimed a desire to
eliminate the use of terrorist tactics globally'14 and intended for
the ATA to help prompt the formation of a global antiterrorism
norm. The broadest liability possible would further these
universalities' interests. Despite the ATA's potential breadth,
testimony before the Judiciary Subcommittee considering the bill
highlighted the fact that it would likely be rarely used. 1
42
138 Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Grassley) (stating that the victims of the attack
"died because they were Americans"); id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Thurmond) ("This
legislation will provide a new civil cause of action in Federal court for acts of
international terrorism directed at U.S. nationals."). But see id. at 49 (statement of
Sen. Heflin) (expressing concern with "the rise in attacks involving innocent
bystanders").
139 132 Cong. Rec. 2355-59 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Specter).
140 See BLAKESLEY, supra note 6, at 115 n.224; supra Part 1.5.
141 1990 ATA Hearing, supra note 57, at 4 (statement of Sen. Thurmond)
("Terrorism of any kind cannot be tolerated.").
112 A representative of the Department of State did not expect the ATA to be
invoked often:
It may be that, as a practical matter, there are not very many
circumstances in which the law can be employed. To our knowledge... few
terrorist organizations are likely to have cash assets or property located in
the United States that could be attached and used to fulfill a civil
judgment.
Id. at 17 (statement of Alan J. Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor, Dep't of State).
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Thus, the legislative statements indicate a desire to reconcile
different views by fudging the distinctions between the different
bases of jurisdiction, similar to United States v. Yunis. First,
Congress justified the laws as protecting victims "who died
because they were Americans."143 Second, Congress wanted to
eliminate terrorism worldwide, but international law had failed
to develop as Congress wanted. Thus, Congress likely settled on
legislating against attacks based on the victim's U.S. nationality,
a concept the U.S. generally opposed in other areas, 14' as a
compromise that would encompass attacks specifically directed
at Americans but that was broad enough to further certain
members' universalist goals.
Plaintiffs have options other than the ATA to bring claims
arising out of terrorist acts that are not limited to suits by U.S.
nationals. Yet, the alternatives to the ATA do not establish the
broad liability that the ATA does, in both the swath of conduct
that gives rise to a claim and their extraterritorial reach.
2. Terrorism as a Predicate Felony for RICO's Civil Provisions:
A Law of Unclear Potential
Following amendments contained in the USA PATRIOT
Act, 45 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") now allows civil suits'46 against those who participate in
racketeering enterprises that affect interstate commerce.'47 The
amendment expanded RICO's predicate felonies to include many
federal crimes related to terrorism, including, inter alia,
financing and providing material support. 14
It would seem that civil liability for terrorism under RICO
after the Amendment would be as broad as that under the ATA
because conduct violating the ATA provides the predicate
criminal acts for RICO purposes. Nevertheless, plaintiffs have
been unsuccessful in pleading RICO claims for terrorist acts both
143 Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
'" See Robinson, supra note 45, at 488-91 (noting the various points at which
the U.S. opposed other countries' use of the nationality of the victim).
145 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 813, 115 Stat. 272, 382.
11 See 18 U.S.C § 1964(c) (2006) (allowing civil suit for a violation of RICO's
criminal provisions).
141 Id. § 1962(b). See generally Goldsmith & Goodman, supra note 118, at 123-
25.
148 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (including offenses listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332b(g)(5)(B) as predicate felonies).
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at home and abroad. The difficulty lies in a potentially more
limited extraterritorial reach, a limitation on corporate liability
for noncentral actors, and the general difficulties in showing a
criminal enterprise.'49
RICO's civil liability may only reach conduct that has
significant ties with the United States, in contrast to the ATA.
The extraterritoriality of RICO remains a matter of dispute
among courts. The prevailing view applies either the conduct
test or the effects test to determine whether or not RICO applies
to conduct outside the United States.' 50 The conduct test allows
RICO to apply extraterritorially to all conduct when some
material conduct leading to the injury occurs within the United
States. The effects test allows for extraterritorial application of
RICO when the activity is both intended to and does have a
substantial and direct effect within the United States. Although,
in theory, these "territorial" bases are more limited than other
jurisdictional bases, in practice, these tests can reach quite far if
applied loosely. For example, some courts have been less than
dutiful in requiring a direct and intended effect, allowing mere
knowledge of attenuated effects to satisfy the effects test.'5 ' At
the other extreme, one court has refused to apply RICO
extraterritorially at all.'52 RICO thus may apply to less than all
the potential terrorist acts that harm U.S. interests due to its
territorial limitations.
149 See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 827-
28 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2859
(2009) (dismissing RICO claims against banks and charities, which allegedly helped
fund al-Qaeda); Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank, N.A., 256 F. Supp. 2d 158, 163-64
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead bank was a
"central figure" in criminal enterprise of money laundering).
150 See Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 115-16 (D.D.C. 2005) ("The
activity at issue must, at minimum, produce or be intended to produce effects in this
country."); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 555-56 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (finding conduct and effects tests not satisfied in that situation); United States
v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1517 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (applying effects test); see
generally Eric Engle, Extraterritorial Corporate Criminal Liability: A Remedy for
Human Rights Violations?, 20 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 287, 320-23 (2006).
' See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL
319887, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (finding that allegations of bribery and
suborning human rights abuses in exploiting oil fields in Nigeria had a sufficiently
direct effect in the United States when forty percent of Nigeria's oil is exported to
the United States).
152 See Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. 349, 357 (D. Or. 1991) (holding that
RICO does not apply extraterritorially).
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One could argue that the USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to
RICO require expanding RICO's extraterritorial reach. Many
courts have stated that RICO should be "liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purpose."'53  Arguably, RICO's civil
provisions should reach as far as the criminal provision against
terrorism that the USA PATRIOT Act added to the list of the
predicate offenses. However, no court has yet given it such a
construction, nor does the legislative history provide a clear
congressional intent that would indicate a disapproval of the
prior construction given to RICO.' In fact, the legislative
history implies that Congress neither considered the impact of
the amendment on RICO's civil provisions, nor did it intend that
the terrorist predicates would result in a different operation of
the RICO statute.1 5' At the very least, its extraterritorial reach
will remain controversial for the near future.
Besides the difficulty in overcoming the extraterritorial
application of the civil RICO provisions, courts have been
reluctant to apply RICO to corporations not considered essential
members of terrorist enterprises. For example, banks that were
used to funnel money for racketeering activities under RICO may
not be vicariously liable, even if their employees had knowledge
that the money was used for criminal activities, unless
the employees were "central figure[s]" or "aggressor[s]" in the
scheme. 15' The "central figure" requirement for RICO severely
... Doe I, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (quoting Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
922, 947 (1970); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1977)).
154 Given the scope of the bill and speed at which it was passed, the legislative
history contains little reference to the RICO provisions, merely stating:
Both the House and Senate bills included this provision to amend the RICO
statute to include certain terrorism-related offenses within the definition of
"racketeering activity," thus allowing multiple acts of terrorism to be
charged as a pattern of racketeering for RICO purposes. This section
expands the ability of prosecutors to prosecute members of established,
ongoing terrorist organizations that present the threat of continuity that
the RICO statute was designed to permit prosecutors to combat.
147 CONG. REC. 20694 (2001) (Statement of Sen. Leahy) (introducing for the Record
a section-by-section analysis of the bill in lieu of a report).
155 Id.
156 See Dubai Islamic Bank v. Citibank, N.A., 256 F. Supp. 2d 158, 165 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (dismissing money laundering claims against a bank, whose employees
allegedly knew they were aiding a fraudulent conspiracy).
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limits plaintiffs from using RICO to target the web of charities
and corporations that may have been involved in financing
terrorist acts. 1
57
Thus, despite the claimed potential for RICO civil actions
against acts of terrorism, its application is limited to terrorist
acts with substantial effects in the U.S. and only against the
"central figures" of the terrorist enterprise. The ATA remains a
more promising cause of action for American citizens.
3. Suits Against State Sponsors of Terror: The Search for a
Cause of Action
Until recent Congressional action, the existence of a cause of
action against state sponsors of terrorism was much debated.
Many cases, most notably several cases from the D.C. district
court, had found that the act that removes foreign state
sovereign immunity in suits for state sponsors of terrorism,
besides simply abrogating sovereign immunity, also created a
cause of action.158 However, the D.C. Circuit rejected this line of
cases in 2004.159 The rejection of an implied cause of action
threatened to severely limit plaintiffs' available causes of action
against state sponsors of terrorism due to the lack of other
alternatives.1 0  Because the ATA cannot apply to foreign
states, 16 1 victims of state-sponsored terrorism were forced to rely
on two other statutes that recognize torts in violation of
international law. Congress recently created a cause of action for
victims of state-sponsored terrorist acts, provided that the victim
is a national of the U.S., member of the U.S. military, or
otherwise employed by the U.S. or peforming a contract awarded
17 See In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 827-
28 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (alleging, unsuccessfully, that charities and corporations that
were conduits for terrorist financing were liable under RICO).
... See e.g., Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 274 F. Supp. 2d
20, 30-32 (D.D.C. 2003); see also Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a
New Front: Dismantling the International Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups
Through Federal Statutory and Common Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 679,
706-09 (2005) (analyzing wealth of terrorism cases recently addressed by the courts
of D.C.).
" Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1027 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
.60 See Strauss, supra note 158, at 708-09.
161 Id.
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by the U.S. government. 16 2 Additionally, the cause of action only
allows suits against designated state sponsors of terrorism, and
so the cause of action against foreign states remains limited
despite Congress clarifying its existance.' 6'
4. Causes of Action Deriving from Domestic Recognition of
International Law
Although many commentators have called for acts of
terrorism to be considered violations of customary international
law,6 4 the actual private causes of action allowed by U.S. courts
for violations of international law are more limited. Two statutes
can be used to establish liability for acts of terrorism that violate
the "law of nations": the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture
Victims Protection Act.
a. The Alien Tort Claim Act: Arguing That Terrorism Is an
International Tort
First, the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") allows suit by
foreign nationals for violations of the laws of nations (customary
international law) or a treaty of the United States. 16 5  The
number of these violations remains limited. The Supreme Court
interpreted the ATCA as only authorizing new causes of action
based on international laws with "a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th-century paradigms" of piracy, violation of
safe conducts, and violation of the rights of ambassadors. 16
"62 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338-44. For a greater discussion of the impact of the Act, see
Debra M. Strauss, Reaching out to the Internation Community: Civil Lawsuits as the
Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L LAW
307,327-36 (2009).
"' National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338-44.
164 See Randall, supra note 63, at 103-04 (noting that there may be universal
jurisdiction for civil actions arising from terrorist acts based on treaties and
customary international law); see also BLAKESLEY, supra note 6, at 132-33 (stating
that various treaties condemning certain terrorist acts and domestic criminal law of
all countries "when considered as a whole, make it clear that terrorism-including
hostage taking, kidnapping, intentional or wanton violence against innocent
civilians-is often really a composite term that includes, or could be, any one of
several separate universally condemned offenses"); Murphy, supra note 63, at 103-
05 (calling for international convention to recognize and enforce civil judgments for
terrorist acts).
165 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
161 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
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"Terrorism," as defined by the ATA, lacks the "definite content
and acceptance among civilized nations"167 of these exemplars.
Recent developments do not aid the universality position. For
example, proponents of universal antiterrorist jurisdiction often
point to U.N. Security Counsel Resolution 1373 ("Resolution
1373") and several antiterrorism treaties as opinio juris of a
general antiterrorism norm."'8 Resolution 1373, passed shortly
after the September 11 attacks, calls on states to work to
prevent terrorist acts and punish those who engage in such
acts. 16 9  However, Resolution 1373 avoids the hurdle that has
stymied previous attempts at international cooperation: defining
terrorism. Although the Resolution contains strong language
about preventing "terrorism," Resolution 1373 fails to direct
nations as to who is a terrorist and who is a "freedom fighter." At
no point in the Resolution is the meaning of terrorism clarified.
Part of the discussion in passing the ATA was that several
attempts to negotiate international compacts for the enforcement
of civil judgments against terrorist failed due to the inability to
define terrorism in international law. 17' Recent developments,
most notably Resolution 1373, do not alter the fact that
international law does not prohibit "terrorism" due to the lack of
an accepted definition. Thus if the ATCA is to support a cause of
"' Id. at 732. The D.C. Circuit, when presented with the specific question of
whether terrorism was actionable under the ATCA, found that terrorist attacks
outside the scope of international conventions were not violations of the law of
nations. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 548-49 (D.D.C.
1981). Although, the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings would
now likely cover the bombing at issue in Tel-Oren. See Murphy, supra note 63, at 50-
52, 5 1,8 See Ruth Wedgwood, Civil Remedies and Terrorism, in CIVIL LITIGATION
AGAINST TERRORISM, supra note 63. at 159, 169 ("Though no one supposes that a
Security Council resolution would be enforced directly by national private attorneys
general through a newly conceived international tort law, nonetheless the decision of
September 28 can be taken as a redefinition of what it means to be culpable in a
terrorist scheme."); Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48
HARV. INT'L L.J. 121, 179-80 (2007) ("The Resolution reaffirms a universal and
unequivocal condemnation of terrorism . . . .").
See S.C. Res. 1373, 1-2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
1 See 1990 ATA Hearing, supra note 57, at 16 (statement of Alan J. Kreczko,
Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State) ("While we have made a start in
prosecuting the perpetrators of terrorist acts, it is still unfortunately the case that
victims of terrorism generally remain uncompensated.").
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action, the activity at issue must violate an international norm of
definite content and acceptance independent from a general
prohibition on "terrorism."
Norms of definite content may exist in international law for
a limited group of terroristic activities based on widely ratified
treaties that could give rise to at least universal criminal
jurisdiction. 7' The strongest claim would be that terrorist acts
constituting torture by foreign officials give rise to a cause of
action under the ATCA because of the growing recognition of
torture as an international tort cognizable under the ATCA.
172
This requires showing purposeful infliction of severe pain and
suffering for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession,
inflicting punishment, coercion, or discrimination. 173  This
definition of torture will exclude many terrorist acts because
terrorist acts are often not committed under the color of law nor
committed for those specified purposes.
International treaties that require prosecution for violent
acts endangering the safety of an aircraft, 174 the unlawful seizure
of an aircraft, 17' bombing of certain public areas, 176 hostage
... See Colangelo, supra note 168, at 177-85 (arguing that "renouncing and
fighting terrorist acts is regarded by states as fulfillment of an international legal
obligation").
172 See Kadic v. Karadz, 70 F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1995). But see Price v.
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiraya, 294 F.3d 82, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(finding Libyan state conduct not severe enough to constitute torture).
171 See Price, 294 F.3d at 91-93.
17 See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.T.S. 565, 974 U.N.T.S.
178. The convention has 182 parties. See CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES,
INVENTORY OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION ORGANIZATION AND REGIMES
2009 EDITION 446-48 (2009), available at http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/
CNSIONP Inventory 2009_Edition.pdf.
175 See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(Hague Convention), Oct. 14, 1971, 22 U.T.S. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105. 161 States
are party to the convention. See CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES,
INVENTORY OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION ORGANIZATION AND REGIMES
2009 EDITION 443-46 (2009), available at http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/CNS-
IONP Inventory_2009_Edition.pdf.
l7' See G.A. Res. 52/164, art. 2, 1, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (Jan. 9, 1998)
(defining bombing of "a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public
transportation system or an infrastructure facility" as an offense which must be
prohibited by domestic law). This convention has 161 parties. See CENTER FOR
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS 1 (2009), available at http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/
bomb.pdf.
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taking, 7' financing acts of terrorism prohibited in the other
treaties,178  and attacks on diplomats and other protected
persons1 7 9 have been widely ratified. These treaties could
support finding that the specified prohibitions have become part
of international customary law regarding universal jurisdiction.
However, it would be difficult to say that the norm would cover
general terroristic conduct not prohibited by these treaties.
Despite the widespread acceptance of these treaties,
establishing a cause of action under the ATCA for violations of
the treaties faces several challenges. First, most of the major
antiterrorism treaties are not self-executing. 8 ' Given the length
at which the Sosa Court went to limit new causes of action under
the ATCA, the fact that the treaty reserves implementation may
prevent the standard of conduct from being of the definite and
universal character needed to justify allowing a private cause of
action without a statute recognizing a specific cause of action.
Second, liability under U.S. criminal law and the ATA extends
far beyond the conduct international treaties criminalize."'
177 See International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, June 3, 1983,
T.I.A.S. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S 205. The Hostage Convention has 161 parties. OFFICE
OF THE ASSISTANT LEGAL ADVISOR FOR TREATY AFFAIRS, supra note 70, at 446-47.
"' See G.A. Res. 54/109, art. 1-3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Apr. 10, 2002).
There are 160 signatories to the convention. CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION
STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING
OF TERRORISM 1 (2009), http://www.nti.org/e-research/official-docs/inventory/pdfs/
finterr.pdf.
"' See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28
U.T.S 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167. This convention has 146 parties. CENTER FOR
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, supra note 176, at 1.
0 See Goldsmith & Goodman, supra note 118, at 128-29 (noting the possible
exception of the Montreal Convention).
"' The first general criminal antiterrorism provisions passed by Congress were
intended to fill the gaps left between the antiterror treaties addressing specific types
of conduct. Senator Specter, the proponent of the Terrorist Prosecution Act of 1985,
which would eventually become the criminal provisions in the Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, noted that the murder of a Navy diver that
occurred after the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 would likely not be covered by
antihijacking legislation then in effect pursuant to an international treaty.
Prosecution Authorization Hearings, supra note 24, at 41 (statement of Sen.
Specter); id. at 62 (statement of Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, U.S.
Department of State) ("[T]he bill fills a remaining gap in our current structure of
criminal jurisdiction over acts of terrorism by making criminal violent acts
committed against U.S. nationals."); id. at 67 (noting that the killing of two
American civilians at an embassy in El Salvador was not a crime but would have
been had they been taken hostage). Nor do the treaties currently recognize criminal
enterprise liability beyond accomplice liability (with the exception of the Bombing
[Vol. 83:12011244
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Thus, relying on only universal norms would severely limit U.S.
antiterrorism law. In addition, none of the major antiterrorist
treaties recognizes a civil cause of action. 8 2  Because criminal
jurisdiction exists, some argue that finding civil liability would be
uncontroversial,183 but unlike in the United States, many
countries do not treat private lawsuits as integral solutions to
social problems.8 4 Thus, private international law regarding
terrorism remains almost wholly undeveloped. This could be a
problem as Sosa left open the question of whether international
law must recognize the offense as a tort or merely a crime.
b. Torture Victim Protection Act: Causes of Action Exists for Acts
of Terrorism Constituting Torture or Extrajudicial Killing
The Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA")18' creates a
cause of action for U.S. nationals for acts of torture or
extrajudicial killing committed under the color of law. It does not
apply to the broad range of conduct that the ATA provides a
cause of action to remedy. Congress intended the TVPA to
supplement the ATCA and it allows claims by U.S. nationals for
torture similar to the claims allowed to aliens under the ATCA.1
6
Unlike the ATCA, the TVPA requires that the plaintiff first
Convention and Financing Convention), and none recognize conspiracy liability. See
Colangelo, supra note 168, at 187-88 (noting that liability under U.S. criminal law
extends far beyond the scope of the major antiterrorist treaties).
182 Judge Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic would require such
a finding. See 726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Other circuits have not required
international law provide a cause of action. Murphy, supra note 63, at 56.
113 See Moore, supra note 67, at 10 (stating that a treaty providing civil liability
"would not seem a stretch").
184 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 1297,1350-53 (2004) (using German and U.S. approaches as a case
study to show that transnational litigation can be affected by different conceptions of
the role litigation plays in society). The debate over the Holocaust litigation that was
filed in the U.S. highlights that the society's attitude towards litigation can be
outcome determinative. Scholars have debated whether such litigation would have
been successful elsewhere and, if not, why would other countries take different
views on litigation over mass social wrongs. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Roles of
Litigation, 80 WASH U. L.Q. 705, 713-14 (2002) (summarizing debate between
scholars over whether other countries' systems would be resistant due to a bias
towards the economically powerful or merely because of a different view on the role
of litigation).
18. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992).
..6 Phillip Mariani, Assessing the Proper Relationship Between the Alien Tort
Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1392-93
(2008).
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exhaust remedies in the state in "which the conduct giving rise to
the claim occurred.' 8 7  Similar to the ATCA, the TVPA has
limited potential in civil litigation over terrorism, but a few
plaintiffs have been successful.188 Its impact grew as plaintiffs
looked for a cause of action against state sponsors of terrorism in
the wake of the D.C. Circuit's finding that the provision removing
sovereign immunity for certain state sponsors of terror does not
create a cause of action."8 9 However, because Congress has since
provided such a cause of action, the TVPA is unlikely to have
much effect on civil litigation over terrorism acts in the future.
B. Despite Broad Substantive Provisions Authorizing Civil
Litigation Against Terrorism, Procedural Doctrines Limit
Plaintiffs' Ability To Recover
Civil litigation over international acts of terrorism triggers a
variety of doctrines that limit suit over international incidents in
U.S. courts. Although the substantive law may seem to be
expansive, the procedural hurdles of bringing suit in U.S. court
have hamstrung litigants. Multiple scholars have noted that
doctrines such as forum non conveniens, personal jurisdiction,
and foreign sovereign immunity present serious challenges to
those wishing to bring suit over international acts of terrorism. 9 '
These procedural limitations serve to curtail an overbroad
substantive law. As one scholar has noted, even if international
law allows exercise of jurisdiction based on the nationality of the
victim, other doctrines should serve to provide meaningful
limitations.' 9 ' Unfortunately, such limitations rarely account for
the importance of certain civil suits to the national security
interests of the United States.
's Torture Victim Protection Act § 2.
See, e.g., Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13, 21 (D.D.C.
2002), affd, No. 04-5162, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7062 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2005)
(finding that the TVPA provided a cause of action against Iran for Iranian funding of
Hamas activity that resulted in the extrajudicial killing of an American).
" See also Strauss, supra note 158, at 710 (noting that the ATCA and TVPA
have been "underutilized" for cases of terrorism).
1o See id. at 690-92; Boyd, supra note 69, at 16-17; Goldsmith & Goodman,
supra note 118, at 115-19.
"' Boyd, supra note 69, at 7-8.
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1. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens poses a potential
barrier to foreign plaintiffs when an alternative forum can be
identified. The doctrine balances a variety of private and public
factors to determine if the domestic forum would be less suited
than an alternative foreign forum. 192 Plaintiffs suing in their
home forums are entitled to greater deference than foreigners
are193 because the Supreme Court worried that international
forum shopping could lead to plaintiffs always opting for
litigation in the assumedly plaintiff-friendly U.S. system but
likely did not want to displace American litigants. Forum non
conveniens effectively requires a U.S. interest primarily for
foreign nationals suing under the ATCA and RICO because of the
presumption in favor of the U.S. forum for U.S. nationals.
However, the traditional public interest factors examine
interests very different from the foreign policy and security
interests of the United States. The "interests" affecting the
reasonableness of litigating in a certain country are not the same
interests involved when applying one's laws to the conduct at
issue.194 The public interest factors in a forum non conveniens
analysis have traditionally included issues of court congestion,
burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty, the
interest in having local controversies decided at home, the
interest in applying applicable law, and the interest in avoiding
conflict of laws. 95 In addition, the doctrine gives U.S. nationals a
strong presumption in favor of a home forum, which fails to
meaningfully temper the excesses of relying on nationality of the
victim as a prescriptive jurisdictional basis. At the same time,
foreign nationals injured in an attack directed at the U.S., which
is the type of attack that most implicates U.S. security interests,
could be barred from suing here, despite the fact that a lawsuit
could bring to light information about threats to Americans.
192 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981).
... Id. at 255-56.
194 At least one scholar has suggested that forum non conveniens helps to make
exercise of universal jurisdiction "reasonable." See Boyd, supra note 69, at 17-20.
However, the argument fails to address whether the factors determining forum
selection are relevant to selecting which countries' laws can and should apply.
Simply because a more convenient forum exists does not negate a state's interest in
having its law applied.
'9' Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
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Although an inquiry such as whether a terrorist attack was
directed at U.S. nationals does not necessarily fall outside the
scope of the doctrine, the doctrine has not been traditionally
understood to encompass such issues. The doctrine traditionally
focused on the practicability and cost-effectiveness of trying
foreign cases in the U.S., rather than the more general impact on
society. For example, in Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels
Corp.,196 the Second Circuit considered a forum non conveniens
motion in a case where three Americans were shot by a religious
fanatic targeting foreign nationals in Egypt. 197 In reversing the
district court's dismissal, the Second Circuit found that the
personal emotional toll that would occur for the plaintiffs if they
had to return to the country that was the site of the gruesome
terrorist incident that killed their relatives was the decisive
factor in favor of a U.S. forum.19 The Second Circuit gave no
thought to the fact that the U.S. has a strong interest in
adjudicating a claim that U.S. citizens had been targeted abroad
solely because of their status as U.S. nationals.
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act
For suits against foreign states that are complicit in terrorist
acts, the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA") often
represents the greatest bar to recovery. The FSIA determines
whether a court has personal jurisdiction over the foreign
country, whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, and whether
the foreign state is immune.199 The FSIA presumptively grants
immunity to all foreign states. 200 However, subject matter and
personal jurisdiction exist once one of the enumerated exceptions
to immunity applies to the incident at issue and sovereign
immunity is abrogated.0 1
The FSIA specifically removes immunity for international
acts of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage
taking, and material support for the same.2 2  However, the
waiver of immunity under this so-called "terrorism exception"
196 224 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2000).
197 Id. at 143-44.
... Id. at 147-48.
199 Boyd, supra note 69, at 27.
2 ) 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
201 See id.
202 Id. § 1605(7) (2006), repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 393-97.
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requires that the executive designate the foreign state a state
sponsor of terrorism 23 and that the victim is a national of the
United States. 20 4  Currently, only four countries are listed as
state sponsors of terror."'
There is also a question whether the "terrorism exception"
provides the exclusive exception for acts of terrorism or whether
other exceptions for commercial activity 06 or a noncommercial
tort with a sufficient nexus in the United States 207 abrogate
immunity for state-sponsored terrorist acts. In the most
prominent decision on the issue, the Second Circuit dismissed the
claims of those killed or injured in the September 11 attacks
against Saudi Arabia and certain members of the Saudi Royal
family because Saudi Arabia has not been named a state sponsor
of terrorism.20  The Second Circuit found that the terrorism
exception provides the exclusive exception to foreign sovereign
immunity for terrorist acts. 209 Thus, only four foreign states can
be sued in the U.S. for terrorist acts they support. If even the
September 11 attacks do not trigger a court to abrogate sovereign
immunity under the nonterrorism related exceptions, only
victims of the four recognized state sponsors of terror are likely
to recover from state sponsors of terror.
3. Personal Jurisdiction
The doctrine of personal jurisdiction similarly requires
plaintiffs to show that the defendants have a stronger nexus with
the United States than simply the injury of a U.S. national.
Victims of terrorism, like other plaintiffs, must satisfy both
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
requirements of the Due Process Clause. 210  For state sponsors
of terror, courts have frequently found the constitutional
requirements of personal jurisdiction satisfied, assuming that
sovereign immunity does not apply. However, plaintiffs wishing
... See id. § 1605(7)(A).
204 Id. § 1605(7)(B)(ii).
20o5 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM (2009), http://www.
state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
207 Id. § 1605(a)(5).
20 See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2008),
aftfd, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009).
219 Id. at 90.
211 See, e.g., Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000).
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to obtain jurisdiction over private defendants have struggled to
show the necessary contacts, unless the terrorist-defendants
happened to coincidently have unrelated contacts to the U.S.
Foreign states have generally been found subject to suit for
two reasons (assuming the terrorist exception applies). First,
some courts have relied on precedent relating to domestic states
that declares states of the union cannot be a "person" for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. 21' Thus, if the requirements of
the waiver of immunity and exercise of statutory personal
jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act are
satisfied, a state is subject to suit. Second, the courts that have
found that the Fifth Amendment does apply to foreign states
have concluded that the FSIA requirements subsumed the
constitutional requirement of minimum contacts.212 These courts
reason that states have sufficient notice that killing a U.S.
national via terrorist attack will result in being haled into court
in the U.S. 213 Thus, exercises of jurisdiction under the FSIA are
generally recognized as supporting personal jurisdiction over
foreign nations, once immunity has been abrogated.
However, plaintiffs attempting to exercise jurisdiction over
nonstate actors have encountered difficulties, despite the fact
that private defendants' contacts to the U.S. are often identical to
that of state sponsors of terror. As stated above, for state
sponsors of terror, courts have said that states are on notice that
sponsoring terrorist activity that risks injuring a U.S. national
also risks U.S. litigation.214 This notice from merely sponsoring
terrorism provides the requisite minimum contacts such that
exercise of jurisdiction over foreign countries does not offend the
notions of "fair play and substantial justice" at the heart of a due
process analysis.215 In contrast, courts have found killing a U.S.
national by terrorist attack insufficient for personal jurisdiction
211 See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic, 999 F. Supp. 1, 19 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966)), superseded by statute
as recognized in Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14039, at
"13 (N.D. Ill. Aug 11, 2003) (finding that Iran did not have due process rights that
exercise of personal jurisdiction would offend).
112 See, e.g., Eisenfeld, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 7 (finding that foreign state causing
the death of a U.S. national has requisite minimum contacts and is put on notice
that it would be haled into court there).
213 Id.
214 See Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 23 (stating as such for state sponsors of terror).
215 Id.
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over nonstate terrorists, despite the fact that nonstate terrorists
presumably have the same notice that state sponsors of terror
have. In Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government
Authority,216 the District of D.C. noted that there was "merit" to
the argument that anyone committing a terrorist act should be
on notice that their victim's court system may seek to exert
jurisdiction.217 However, the Biton Court refused to find that the
minimum contact test was subsumed within the ATA, in contrast
to what courts had done by finding the minimum contact
requirements for state sponsors of terror subsumed within the
terrorist exception of the FSIA.21 8 The Biton Court dismissed the
complaints against individual members of the Palestinian
Authority and the PLO.219
When comparing the two sets of results regarding personal
jurisdiction for the very same conduct, it becomes clear that the
fact that the political branches control who is a state sponsor of
terror is altering courts' personal jurisdiction decisions.
Currently, U.S. courts have jurisdiction over a foreign state that
kills a U.S. national during a state-sponsored terrorist attack-
even if the nationality of the victims was not clear before the
attack-if they are one of the pariah states on the list of the state
sponsors of terror.22 If a private person commits the very same
act, they may not be subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
Courts are likely influenced by the fact that only four states who
have little contact with the U.S. have been named as official state
sponsors of terrorism. This influence is shown by the startlingly
divergent results for suits against private defendants when
compared to the results of suits against official state sponsors of
terror.
Victims of terrorism are not, however, without some
advantages compared to other litigants. The ATA allows
nationwide service of process and thus likely also a national
216 310 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C. 2004).
217 Id. at 178.
218 Id.
211 Id. at 179; see also Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth.,
153 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.R.I. 2001) (applying traditional minimum contacts analysis for
individual plaintiffs).
221 See Flatow v. Islamic Republic, 999 F. Supp. 1, 22-23 (D.D.C. 1998); see also
Watson, supra note 44, at 19.
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minimum contacts test.2 1  The Supreme Court has stated that
conducting an intentional tortious act expressly aimed at the
forum can constitute sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 2  Lower
federal courts have allowed such jurisdiction against the terrorist
who executes attacks against U.S. nationals abroad in order to
put political pressure on the U.S. government, 23 but some courts
show a hesitance to apply this reasoning to those who allegedly
finance or aid terrorists without directing their attacks.
2 4
Plaintiffs attempting to sue in U.S. court for terrorist acts abroad
must overcome the skepticism of the judiciary, shown by their
resistance to find personal jurisdiction over private supporters of
terrorist attacks abroad. Currently, personal jurisdiction
doctrines along with other procedural limitations dilute the
potential of civil actions to secure the U.S. and its nationals.
III. CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM AS A TOOL IN THE
UNITED STATES' NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
Civil suits can supplement military actions, intelligence
gathering, and criminal prosecution. Congress intended as much
in passing the ATA. Despite some of the shortcomings of the
current laws, civil litigation against terrorism can be a strong
force to protect U.S. interests. There exists a potential new basis
for extraterritorial jurisdiction--intent-based national security
jurisdiction-that will both enhance the benefits of civil litigation
against terrorists and sharpen the analytic framework regarding
extraterritorial application of law. This Section summarizes the
potential benefits of civil litigation and introduces a basis for
extraterritorial jurisdiction that maximizes those benefits. This
22 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333-34 (2006); see also Strauss, supra note 158, at 684 (noting
that the enactment of the ATA was intended to remove many jurisdictional hurdles).
221 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984).
"" Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1334-36 (D. Utah 2006) (finding that
personal jurisdiction existed over al-Qaeda member who committed a terrorist act
against U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan); Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 13-14 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (finding personal jurisdiction over Osama bin Laden for bombings of U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania).
1' In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 93-96 (2d Cir. 2008),
affd, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009) (dismissing
claims against four Saudi princes who allegedly contributed to charities that funded
the September 11 attacks because the allegations failed to include that the princes
were aware that terrorist activities would be directed at the U.S.).
[Vol. 83:12011252
FINDING TERRORISTS' INTENT
basis will increase U.S. security while keeping with the spirit of
the established bases of jurisdiction law and will make the limits
more practical for effective implementation by skeptical judges.
A. The United States Needs Civil Litigation Against Terrorism
To Supplement Criminal Enforcement and NonLegal Efforts
Civil litigation can promote private monitoring of the
development and financing of terrorist plots. Policymakers
recognize that even with increased budgets, the ability of the
national security apparatus will be finite.225 Private actors can
help supplement the investigation of past terrorist acts and
potentially provide information not discovered by the
government. Private attorneys general can root out incipient
anti-American terrorists, who may have tried to injure U.S.
nationals in conduct abroad but do not yet have the operational
capacity to attack U.S. soil or disrupt important U.S. government
functions. There is precedent for the use of such litigation. Civil
litigation has proved to be a tool against the growth of violent
hate groups within the U.S. as a supplement to criminal action.22 6
Other proposals relating to terrorism have tried to harness the
ability of private persons to supplement the national security
apparatus with devices such as the controversial terrorist futures
market.227 The Klinghoffer case22 and September 11 litigation229
furnished information previously unknown by the U.S.
government. With reform to align plaintiffs' interests with
national security, the system can supplement other means of
combating terrorism.
25 Barry R. Posen, The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy,
and Tactics, INT'L SEC., Winter 2001-02, at 39, 55 ("The United States requires a
strategy to guide its [antiterrorism] efforts, including the allocation of resources.
That strategy must set priorities, because resources are scarce and this war will
prove expensive.").
26£ Strauss, supra note 158, at 682 & n.7 (listing numerous large jury awards
against hate groups).
227 See Robert Looney, DARPA's Policy Analysis Market for Intelligence: Outside
the Box or off the Wall?, 2 STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, Sept. 2003, http://www.nps.
edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2003/septO3/terrorism.html
(describing how the market would have worked).
.2 Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille
Laura in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
2" Chris Mondics, Another Tack in Terror-Financier Lawsuit, PIlLA. INQUIRER,
Aug. 20, 2008, at Al (noting that the September 11 litigation has brought to light
connections between certain banks and terrorist activity).
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The potential of civil litigation as a national security tool
remains great. Civil litigation can serve to interrupt financing of
terrorist activities, which remains a key requirement for terrorist
groups.230 Information gathered from antiterrorism lawsuits can
provide intelligence to the government on the sources of terrorist
funding. Such information can also provide greater knowledge to
the public about terrorist groups, which solidifies public support
for the struggle against anti-American terrorist groups. 3'1 The
monetary sanctions that civil judgments provide may deter
actors with nonideological commitment to terrorists' causes, such
as those who knowingly aid terrorists out of greed. 32 Plaintiffs
in civil suits may in fact be much more likely to obtain judgments
and evidence than the government while bringing a criminal
suit.233 In addition, the Hague Evidence Convention, although
highly limited, provides a method for the taking of evidence
abroad in civil cases. 234 At the very least, it will prevent those
financing terrorism from gaining any benefit to holding assets
within the United States for fear of civil lawsuits.
Enforcement of antiterrorism lawsuits remains a problem,
but not an insurmontable one. Few terrorist groups keep assets
in the U.S.235 Other countries may be resistant to enforcing U.S.
judgments, even against terrorism groups. 236  However, a more
limited jurisdictional basis will likely increase and not decrease
the willingness of other states to enforce these judgments. In
addition, financiers and others who aid terrorism may be more
likely to have assets in the U.S.23  In contrast to other types of
210 See Moore, supra note 67, at 7 (noting that "a key logistic requirement for
terrorism is the financing ... to effectively carry it out").
21 Id. at 8 ("Telling the truth about terrorism as an antidote to the obfuscation
and political warfare accompanying the terrorist operations is perhaps half of the
battle required in winning the war against terrorism.").
2:32 See Wedgwood, supra note 168, at 168-69 ("It is unrealistic to suppose that a
person dedicated to jihad is going to be affected by financial calculations, but it is
conceivable that actors who are on the periphery of the scheme may be given
pause.").
21 See Murphy, supra note 63, at 44 (noting that civil plaintiffs have greater
discovery tools and a lower burden of proof).
211 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
211 See Wedgwood, supra note 168, at 178-79.
23 See id.
2 7 See Michael D. Goldhaber, Two D.C. Lawyers' Own War on Terror, LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2006, at 24 (quoting a leading proponent of civil antiterrorism
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litigation, victims of terrorism may be motivated partially by
nonmonetary goals such as the need to have their day in
court.23" Thus, some increased difficulty in enforcing judgments
compared to typical private litigation may be offset by factors
making terrorism plaintiffs less deterred by problems with the
enforcement of judgments.
B. Security, Legality, and Practicality: Guiding Principles
The most effective reform to the current system of civil
litigation regarding terrorism actually may be a reduction in its
scope.239 Currently, there is little effective filtering between
litigation that furthers U.S. security interests and litigation that
does not. Congress should put a limit on the extraterritorial
application of civil antiterrorism laws in a way that will
accomplish three things: First, the limit must differentiate
between terrorist acts that pose a threat to national security
and those that do not; second, it must allow for a viable
argument to the international community that it does not violate
international law; and lastly, it must be defined clearly enough to
overcome domestic courts' reluctance to "make law" in the area of
national security and diplomatic relations.
Each of these guiding principles justifies changing the scope
of antiterrorism laws. First, suits against terrorist are most
effective as national security tools if their reach is limited to
states and actors posing a threat to the country, not as a means
of deterring a type of warfare. Second, as discussed above, the
current framework for extraterritorial application of laws does
not account for unconventional security threats. Third, plaintiffs
have been largely unsuccessful in bringing suit for international
acts of terrorism with the exception of when the opposing party
litigation as saying "[w]e have a much more modest goal, and that's to deter
respectable financial institutions from being fellow travelers of the jihad").
2"' For example, Professor Carl Tobias told the New York Times that the
September 11 litigation was likely less affected by issues of recovery:
I think the dynamics here may be different from what I would call more
garden variety kind of tort litigation .... It doesn't seem this is entirely
driven by money, though it may be for some people. People want to tell
their stories and want to find out as much as they can in court.
Anemona Hartocollis, Settlements Do Not Deter 9/11 Plaintiffs Seeking Trials, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007, at B1.
"" Others have expressed concern over any cutback in antiterrorism civil
litigation. See Moore, supra note 67, at 5 (expressing concern by calling proceeding
too broadly "nonsense on stilts").
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fails to appear. 2" A more directed authorizing statute will
negate the need for courts to be concerned with the interests of
the United States in allowing the suit. The easier it is to apply
the limitation, the more likely the court will allows suits and the
more successful suits may be in bringing to light terrorist activity
and financing.
1. Security: Eliminating Counterproductive Lawsuits While
Keeping Productive Lawsuits
Currently, suits against terrorists can aid but can also
hinder U.S. attempts to combat terrorism and provide security to
its nationals. For example, two of the earliest successes under
the ATA were for attacks by Hamas agents on persons whom
they thought were Israeli nationals. One victim was an
American student studying at a yeshiva in Israel,241 and the
other victims were a U.S. citizen and his wife who were domiciled
in Israel.242 The success of those plaintiffs has spawned other
suits arising from the deaths of Americans residing in Israel.243
Certainly, the deaths were tragic and compensation was well
justified. However, it is not clear that U.S. law should provide
the rule of decision or that U.S. interests are served by the
verdicts in those cases. In these instances, Israeli or Palestinian
authorities can and do pursue criminal charges,244 and Israeli law
allows for compensation. 245  The U.S. deeming a Palestinian at
240 See Wedgwood, supra note 168, at 175 n.35.
241 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 2002).
242 Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Auth., 153 F. Supp. 2d 76,
82-83, 98 (D.R.I. 2001).
243 See Knox v. Palestine Liberation Org., 306 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(evaluating claim that American killed while singing at a Bat Mitzvah in Israel by
alleged PLO agents could recover under the ATA); Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-
Gov't Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C. 2004) (allowing suit to proceed against the
PLO and Palestinian Authority where an American residing in Israel was killed
during the bombing of a school bus).
244 Boim, 291 F.3d at 1002 (mentioning that one defendant participated in a
suicide bombing while awaiting trial by the Palestinian Authority Court for Boim's
murder, but the other defendant was convicted and sentenced to ten years in jail);
Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (noting that several defendants were convicted by an
Israeli court).
24 In Ungar, the court found that the state law claims were not valid but that
choice of law allowed for Israeli law claims in addition to the ATA-if the plaintiff
had chosen to plead them. Ungar, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 99. After amending the
complaint, three Israeli law claims were added, which became part of the later
default judgment. Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274, 277, 294 (1st
Cir. 2005).
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"fault" for an "act of terror" can complicate U.S. foreign policy
and harm its security strategy with regard to the Middle East.
This failure to squarely address what U.S. interests are involved
may also be the source of courts' reluctance to act in the sensitive
area of counterterrorism policy.
The current framework for civil actions arising from acts of
terrorism developed in a much different security situation than
America now faces. It developed where terrorism appeared to be
a threat to Americans travelling abroad24 6 or a tool of communist
groups in third world countries,247 but did not yet appear to be a
central problem of national security.248 In passing the ATA and
other antiterrorism civil provisions, Congress meant to provide
compensation to victims and a tool in the struggle against
terrorism, without realizing that in some cases the two goals may
conflict. Determining issues of compensation for terrorist acts of
foreign nationals in a foreign state where an American was an
unintended casualty can weaken and not strengthen U.S.
security interests. It requires U.S. courts to pass normative
judgments of fault in sensitive areas of foreign relations. If the
goal is compensation, the U.S. may provide such compensation
more effectively through its own coffers and the seized assets of
terrorist organizations, without resort to civil trials.
However, civil litigation against terrorism can be used as an
effective tool in maximizing the security of the United States. To
do so, the availability of a cause of action must be limited to
incidents where further investigation supports U.S. policy
interests. Terrorism constitutes a tactic that can be used by both
our enemies and allies alike (in addition to those who are simply
246 See 1990 ATA Hearing, supra note 57, at 1 (statement of Sen. Grassley) ("A
terrorist, for reasons nobody understands, for reasons beyond the concept of
humanity, blows a plane out of the air or hijacks a ship or shoots a father, murders a
wife, husband, sister or brother.").
247 Prosecution Authorization Hearings, supra note 24, at 2 (statement of Sen.
Denton) ("There is, for example, a clear pattern of Soviet-supported and Soviet-
equipped insurgencies....").
248 See George W. Bush, Introduction to NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE
NAT'L SEC. STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/15538.pdf.
Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities
to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring
great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a
single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn
the power of modern technologies against us.
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ambivalent to our interests).2 4 ' The broad statutes authorizing
suit based on the principle of passive personality maximizes
recovery for U.S. nationals but fails to make a meaningful
distinction between acts of terrorism that threaten U.S. interests
and those that do not.
As the rhetoric of the War on Terror moves beyond naming
the tactic of terrorism as our "enemy"250 towards a political
realist assessment of what threats we face and what allies we
have, 5 1 Congress should reexamine the purpose of authorizing
suits against perpetrators of terrorist acts. Congress should
develop a limitation on extraterritorial application of civil
antiterrorism statutes that truly invoke a reasonable basis of
jurisdiction. Such a change will allow the United States to
attempt to establish international law recognizing the ability of
the United States to regulate extraterritorially in its own
defense. This may be more successful than trying to establish a
jus cogens norm prohibiting international terrorism.
Despite the hopes of those who passed extraterritorial
criminal antiterrorism laws and the ATA,2 terrorism has not
become an international crime or tort abhorred worldwide.
Instead, "terrorism" continues to elude definition under
international law.25 3  One day, these limits on customary
international law may disappear and international antiterrorism
and human rights regulation may gain respect. In the interim, if
249 Prosecution Authorization Hearings, supra note 24, at 2 (1985) (statement of
Sen. Denton) (calling terrorism "the most widely practiced form of modern warfare").
250 See NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 248, at 5 ("The enemy is not a
single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is
terrorism .... ").
25' For example, the National Security Strategy of 2006 rephrases the struggle
against terrorism from stamping out terrorism to protecting ourselves and our allies
from terrorist attacks. Compare NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 248, at 1
(listing goals as to "[s]trengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to
prevent attacks against us and our friends"), with NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL,
supra note 248, at 6 ("As we consider which approaches to take, we will be guided by
what will most effectively advance freedom's cause while we balance other interests
that are also vital to the security and well-being of the American people.").
22 See Prosecution Authorization Hearings, supra note 24, at 40 (statement of
Sen. Specter) (noting that universal remedies under international law "will take a
longer period of time, and my sense is that we ought to move in a direct line to
define crimes which are violations of the laws of the United States").
... C.L. Lim, The Question of a Generic Definition of Terrorism Under General
International Law, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 37-51 (Victor V.
Ramraj, et al. eds., 2005) (depicting the failure of treaty-based and customary
international law to develop a generic definition of terrorism).
1258 [Vol. S3:1201
FINDING TERRORISTS' INTENT
the period is indeed an interim one, the ATA and other statutes
should be redesigned to recognize the reality that not all terrorist
acts that injure U.S. nationals concern the security of the U.S.
2. Legality: Building a Foundation for the Legal Response to
Unconventional National Security Threats
Although the categories listed by the American Society for
International Law fail to adequately guide the proper legal
response to nonconventional threats such as terrorism, the
principles contained in the categories can help justify a new basis
of prescriptive jurisdiction. Currently, the three most expansive
bases of jurisdiction provide insight into the rationale for
why a country may want to apply its antiterrorism law
extraterritorially, but the categories fail to capture the
motivation behind antiterrorism law. Universal jurisdiction
recognizes that certain conduct may be so abhorrent as to justify
a different basis of jurisdiction. Protective jurisdiction recognizes
that states have the opportunity to use its law, and not just force,
to ensure the survival of the state when others intend to disrupt
government functions. Passive personality recognizes that the
country wishing to apply its law has an interest in the protection
of its citizens abroad.
However, each doctrine has a corresponding weakness.
Universal jurisdiction requires a global consensus that will be
difficult to achieve, and thus conduct that is not universally
abhorrent nor easily definable will fail to become a global norm.
Protective jurisdiction requires intent to disrupt an important
governmental function, which fails to account for the ability of
terrorists to damage a state's interest by targeting only civilian
activity.2"4 Passive personality remedies this defect of protective
jurisdiction but reaches too broadly by including all injuries to a
country's nationals. These limitations are why the U.S. has been
2. The purpose of using terrorist tactics, as exemplified by al-Qaeda, is that it
"spreads psychological terror that is disproportionate to the death and destruction
its actions unleash." Peter J. Katzenstein, Same War: Different Views: Germany,
Japan, and Counterterrorism, 57 INT'L ORG. 731, 734 (2003). For example, studies
have found that terrorist attacks directed at U.S. investments in more developed
countries cost one million dollars per incident. See Walter Enders et al., The Impact
of Transnational Terrorism on U.S. Foreign Direct Investment, 59 POL. RES. Q. 517,
531 (2006). The study did not find a statistically significant effect on terrorist
attacks in less developed countries, which may be explained by the relatively small
number of attacks. See id. at 517, 531.
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put in the awkward position of proclaiming the existence of
passive personality jurisdiction with respect to terrorism and
disclaiming it elsewhere.
Given the importance of cooperation in the struggle against
anti-American terrorist groups, the U.S. will have to make an
attempt to engage the rest of the world regarding the proper
legal response to nonconventional terrorist threats. One of
the most effective ways to convince other countries to aid in
discovery and recognize U.S. judgments will be to justify the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antiterrorism laws to the
international legal community. This requires developing a
jurisdictional basis between universality and the protective
principle that reflects a country's interest in applying its laws to
unconventional national security threats abroad. Passive
personality currently sweeps too broadly, and the international
community remains skeptical of its use.
3. Practicality: Convincing Judges To Hear the Type of
International Terrorism Cases That Enhance U.S. National
Security
Judges tread carefully in areas that affect U.S. foreign policy
and national security. While this prudence may be called for
generally, in the antiterrorism area, judges' caution prevents the
implementation of a potential counterterrorism tool. The most
recent and most important embodiment of the federal judiciary's
resistance to hearing civil cases that involve questions of foreign
policy and national security arose from the September 11
litigation. In upholding the dismissal of claims against various
princes, charities, and instrumentalities of Saudi Arabia on
sovereign immunity grounds, Chief Judge Jacobs, writing for the
Second Circuit, illustrated an express hostility towards civil
litigation in this area:
The remainder lof the September 11 plaintiffs' arguments]
overlook what is at stake here: civil liability. That a foreign
sovereign is immune to civil claims brought by the victims of its
alleged wrongdoing does not mean it has unfettered discretion
to commit atrocities against United States nationals.
Deterrence (or punishment) does not begin and end with civil
litigation brought by individual plaintiffs. Our government has
other means at its disposal-sanctions, trade embargos,
diplomacy, military action-to achieve its foreign policy goals
and to deter (or punish) foreign sovereigns. Although the FSIA
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did open an avenue of redress for certain individual victims of
state-sponsored terrorism, it did not delegate to the victims,
their counsel and the courts the responsibility of the executive
branch to make America's foreign policy response to acts of
terrorism committed by a foreign state, including whether
federal courts may entertain a victim's claim for damages. 5
Chief Judge Jacobs is not been alone in his hostility towards
litigation in the area. The most successful suits are often those
against countries and terrorists from countries that have little to
no relationship with the United States-such as Iran.25
However, the embarrassment other countries may be faced
with if exposed as complicit by private litigation will deter them
from aiding terrorist acts.2 58 Terrorist activity will lessen as few
countries will be willing to risk being safe havens for anti-
American terrorist groups. Countries that proclaim to the
international community to be allies in the struggle against
terrorism while sending a different message to terrorist groups
will risk being exposed publically. Civil litigation can provide the
government and the public with better information than we
currently have on private and state-sponsored terrorist groups
posing a threat to the U.S. The problem with the view that
foreign policy and counterterrorism remains solely the
responsibility of the executive branch is that it fails to recognize
the history of the ATA and other antiterrorism statutes in
supplementing executive branch efforts. The advantage of
allowing suit in the U.S. for terrorist acts abroad is that it
creates an incentive to investigate terrorist acts when the
executive has failed to investigate or has done so incompletely.
259
25 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 90 (2d Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009).
151 See Wedgwood, supra note 168, at 159.
2 ,7 For example, Iran, Libya, and Syria occur repeatedly in the list of successful
judgments against state sponsors of terror. See id. at 175 n.35.
251 See Philip B. Heymann, Dealing with Terrorism: An Overview, INT'L SEC.,
Winter 2001-02, at 24, 25 (positing that one reason a terrorist attack did not occur
before September 11 was that harboring states conditioned their aid on groups not
angering the U.S.).
15' For example, many have been critical about the U.S. intelligence
community's priorities and efforts in counterterrorism prior to the September 11
attacks. See Posen, supra note 225, at 47 ("Nevertheless, this intelligence effort has
been the subject of persistent criticism, in particular for weaknesses in interagency
cooperation; failure to concentrate all potentially useful information in one place,
especially information gathered by law enforcement agencies in the United States;
and untimely analysis.").
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C. Using Intent-Based Jurisdiction for Civil Litigation Against
Terrorism To Better Reflect Principles of Security, Legality,
and Practicality
In passing the criminal antiterrorism laws, the ATA, and
newer laws-like the RICO amendments-Congress has so far
failed to consider whether trying to fit its actions into the five
categories listed by the American Society for International Law
in 1935 was the wisest approach. Congress's objectives would be
better served if, instead of trying to shape the five traditional
categories into providing incredibly broad jurisdiction only for
terrorism, it formulated a basis of prescriptive jurisdiction that
fits the needs of countries in an interconnected global community
with international, unconventional global threats.6 0 This new
basis of jurisdiction would fall between protective jurisdiction
and passive personality in terms of breadth, but it would better
reflect the country's interest in applying its laws to
unconventional security threats.
The solution to the problem of finding the right basis for the
extraterritorial basis arises from recognizing that the peculiar
nature of terrorism requires a new jurisdictional basis. The
mistake in relying on passive personality while adding a
terrorism-only proviso is that the proviso and not the nationality
of the victim is the reason the U.S. wishes to legislate
extraterritorially. There should be a sixth basis-national
security jurisdiction-which allows a state to proscribe conduct
that is intended to harm nationals of the state in order to
destabilize the state. This Section formulates a precise
statement of the interests that justify a state applying its laws to
unconventional security threats abroad: protection from groups
that wish to destabilize a nation by limiting its nationals' activity
abroad. It does so in a way that addresses the three concerns,
stated above: (1) tailoring the substantive law to national
security interests (security); (2) providing an acceptable basis to
form international law (legality); and (3) sufficient clarity to
overcome domestic hostility to civil litigation involving foreign
relations (practicality). The U.S. has a choice between two
approaches: (1) continuing to define the jurisdictional basis in
26 The attacks of September 11 and prosecuting terrorist attacks generally have
highlighted the shortcomings of international law in other similar ways. See
Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the 'Wor Against Terrorism,' 78
INT'L AFF. 301, 302-05 (2002).
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terms of terrorism, but limiting the scope of the basis; or
(2) using a basis not limited to terrorism that would allow the
U.S. to apply antiterrorism statutes extraterritorially but that
also allows other countries to apply extraterritorially laws that
target what they perceive as conduct posing a security threat.
1. The ATA Inspired Approach: Terrorism-Based National
Security Jurisdiction
An incremental way to implement some of the proposed
reforms would be to adopt the definition of terrorism in the ATA
as the jurisdictional basis, with modification to ensure that its
scope is limited to cases where there is a U.S. security interest.
This would largely be the approach the U.S. has taken-albeit,
more openly by naming antiterrorism as the express basis for
U.S. action and not justifying it in language of principles of
"protective jurisdiction" or passive personality. This approach
would largely retain current law with a slight amendment to
reflect U.S. interests. Thus, the U.S. could simply argue that
international law should allow extraterritorial application when
the acts are intended to intimidate or coerce the civilian
population of the United States, or another civilian population, to
influence the policy of the United States by intimidation or
coercion, or to affect the conduct of the United States.261 The
difference from the ATA lies in that the coercion must be directed
at the U.S. civilian population or the United States government
rather than simply at any civilian population or foreign
government.
This approach does represent a step towards better tailoring
antiterrorism laws to U.S. national interests because the
terrorists must be either targeting the U.S. civilian population or
intending to alter U.S. policies or interests. Thus, cases where a
U.S. national is an innocent bystander are eliminated. This
approach would be more upfront than the current approach of
claiming that the U.S. is acting based on passive personality but
opposing the same in every other context. However, such
honesty in expressly invoking a terrorism-specific jurisdiction
would likely not overcome the difficulties that prevent the world
community from agreeing on a generic definition of terrorism.
2" This is essentially the approach the Restatement (Third) takes. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g (1987); see also
McCarthy, supra note 105, at 318-21 (advocating for a similar result).
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Many countries may oppose a terrorism-focused jurisdictional
basis because what other countries may view as legitimate
conduct or, at the least, not wholly illegitimate conduct, the U.S.
views as terrorism. For example, if a group of terrorists
concerned about the strong ties of the United States to one side
in a regional or domestic conflict targets U.S. nationals or kills
civilians wishing to change U.S. policy, the countries who
sympathize with those on the opposite side as the U.S. may not
view such conduct as terrorism but as a reaction to U.S.
"meddling." They may think that the application of U.S. law
would further complicate the matter or represents an imperialist
action. A jurisdictional basis less focused on terrorism may be
more successful.
2. Intent-Based National Security Jurisdiction: A Balanced
Approach
Another more effective jurisdictional basis may simply be to
require that, instead of merely injuring a U.S. national, the
terrorist act be intended to physically harm U.S. nationals
because they are U.S. nationals. This would satisfy the first of
the three guiding principles that the limitation must better tie
liability to the presence of a U.S. interest. If the attack is
directed at a person because they are a U.S. national, it is much
more likely that the attack poses a threat to U.S. security
interests than simply if U.S. nationals were inadvertently killed.
In addition, because the focus is intent, it will not matter if a
U.S. national was actually killed or injured in the attack.
Similar to the protective principle, the potential danger justifies
the exercise of jurisdiction, not the results of the attack.
[Vol. 83:12011264
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Table 1: Comparison of Existing and Proposed Bases of
Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional
Basis
Scope of
Prescriptive
Jurisdiction
Rationale for
Extraterritorial
Application of
Law
Limitations of
the Basis in
Combating
Unconventional
Security Threats
Subjective Can regulate Sovereignty Most terrorist
Territoriality conduct at over territory attacks do not
issue if some within the involve conduct
material borders of the within the U.S.
conduct state
occurred
within the
territory
Objective Direct and Interconnected Effects within
Territoriality material world allows for territory from
effects within interference terrorist attacks
the territory within territory abroad are too
that were from outside attenuated and
intended to borders insubstantial to
occur and did support exercise
occur of jurisdiction
Nationality Can regulate Country of Few terrorists
nationals of a nationality are nationals of
country assures the country they
residing protection of its threaten
abroad nationals and
can limit their
conduct
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Jurisdictional
Basis
Scope of
Prescriptive
Jurisdiction
Rationale for
Extraterritorial
Application of
Law
Limitations of
the Basis in
Combating
Unconventional
Security Threats
Can regulate
those who
intend to
disrupt
important
governmental
functions
Any attack
that injures a
national of the
country
Any conduct
which violates
ajus cogens
norm
Restatement Any terrorist
(Third) attack that is
Approach intended to
injure a
national of
that country
because of
their
nationality
Threat to
survival of state
justifies action
before effect
occurs
Desire to protect
its nationals
abroad
Certain conduct
is so abhorrent
that any
country can
punish it
Combination of
abhorrence of
terrorism,
survival of
government,
and protection
of nationals
abroad
Unconventional
security threats
are often
intended to
harm only
civilian targets
Intrusion on
other country's
sovereign not in
proportion to
interests of the
state, problems
of notice
Only certain
terrorist attacks
would violate an
establishedjus
cogens norm
The lack of an
accepted
definition of
terrorism will
limit acceptance
abroad
Protective
Jurisdiction
Passive
Personality
Universality
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Jurisdictional Scope of Rationale for Limitations of
Basis Prescriptive Extraterritorial the Basis in
Jurisdiction Application of Combating
Law Unconventional
Security Threats
Intent-Based Any attack Recognition that A new basis will
National intended to certain attacks take diplomatic
Security physically on civilian efforts to gain
Jurisdiction harm a targets weakens acceptance
national a country's
because of national
their security
nationality
Implementing an intent-based prescriptive jurisdiction can
be accomplished if Congress amends the ATA's and RICO's
antiterrorism predicates to include only acts that were intended
to physically harm U.S. nationals. The ATCA would then still be
left for the development of antiterrorist norms under customary
international law and general jurisdiction if Congress and the
executive wish to continue to pursue further universalist actions.
a. Finding Enemies: Security Benefits of the Intent-Based
Approach
An intent-based approach will facilitate the main benefit of
civil litigation against terrorism: information gathering. Private
attorneys general will be motivated by the potential for civil
recovery to research and attempt to discover whether acts of
terror were targeted at Americans. These suits could reveal anti-
American terrorist organizations, which may only have the
operational capacity to target small groups or a single American
abroad, but which could grow into greater regional or
international terrorist powers. The U.S. intelligence services
may not have the resources or motivation to track such small-
scale organizations; thus, civil litigation can serve as a great
compliment to the national security apparatus.
The downside would be that some terrorist activity may not
target U.S. nationals but does affect U.S. security interests. For
example, this could occur if a group only targets non-U.S.
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nationals who collaborate with the U.S. government or associate
with U.S. nationals. However, any loss in national security in
not allowing suits against such organizations would be offset by
serving the other two goals of establishing international law and
creating a law that could be effective in practice. Limiting suits
in U.S. courts to attacks directed at U.S. nationals recognizes
that the foreign state and not the U.S. has the interest in and
responsibility of addressing attacks intended to kill its own
citizens, even if related to U.S. interests. Second, determining
the strength of U.S. interests in attacks of foreigners without an
easily applied proxy could lead judges to view terrorism lawsuits
negatively because each decision would require judges to balance
important foreign policy and national security interests.
There is great potential for a system organized around
filtering attacks based on whether the intended targets were U.S.
nationals. For example, suppose an anti-American small-scale
terrorist organization sets off a bomb in a heavily populated
tourist destination in the hope of killing Americans. The bomb
only kills locals or non-U.S. foreigners. Under the current ATA
and passive personality regime, because the inept or unlucky
terrorist failed to kill a U.S. national, the U.S. would not claim
jurisdiction.
Imagine a second case, where members of a minority ethnic
group feel persecuted and in retaliation, set an explosive off in
their own government's building. They intend only to harm
employees of this foreign government but, coincidentally, a U.S.
tourist walks by and is killed. Under the current civil
antiterrorism statutes, the U.S. would claim proscriptive
jurisdiction over an attack by terrorists that was intended to
injure only non-Americans, but happened to kill a U.S. national.
In the first case, allowing either non-U.S. nationals who
were injured or U.S. nationals, present but not injured, to sue
would bring to light a terrorist threat to the U.S. that had gone
unnoticed. In the second case, the fact that a U.S. national died,
while tragic, does not necessarily enhance U.S. security by
allowing the victim to sue in U.S. courts.
[Vol. 83:12011268
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b. Winning Friends: Using the Intent-Based Approach To Create
International Law for Unconventional Security Threats
Such an approach would have stronger support inter-
nationally then a terrorism-only jurisdictional basis (which is
effectively the U.S.'s current approach). While being the target of
terrorism may only be a national security concern for a handful
of countries, more countries may be open to a basis that allows
the application of their laws to conduct, targeted at their
nationals, that they deem to be a national security threat. Using
the intent of an actor already has a small but limited recognition
in current sources. The comments to the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations-which, contrary to the Restatement
(Second)," 2 recognize a limited use of the passive personality
principle for terrorist acts-tries to further limit its application
to "organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their
nationality." '263 By eliminating the use of passive personality and
terrorist-centric focus, the intent-based national security
jurisdictional basis will make a statement to the world that the
U.S. will now only narrowly apply its laws when it views that its
security is being threatened through attacks intended toward its
nationals. At the same time, the jurisdictional basis is no longer
"terrorism" specific, allowing other countries to apply their laws
to conduct directed against their nationals.
Attempts to form a consensus on the acceptability of intent-
based national security jurisdiction will have immediate benefits.
First, enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad often presents
problems. Several foreign countries have refused to enforce U.S.
judgments because of the "nature of U.S. jurisdictional claims,"
among other factors." 4  In addition, several states have
reciprocity requirements for the recognition and enforcement of
other country's judgments-requiring that the state wishing to
have its judgment enforced must enforce the foreign country's
judgments of the same type.265
262 The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations expressly disclaimed the
existence of passive personality jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 30(2) (1965) ("A state does not have jurisdiction to
prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct of an alien outside its
territory merely on the ground that the conduct affects one of its nationals.").
"I RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g (1987).
264 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 87, at 1016-17.
2' Id. at 1026-27, 1031-32.
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In both cases, the current use of passive personality impedes
enforcement. Intent-based national security jurisdiction will
help to solve both of these problems. In comparison, passive
personality is a controversial and almost limitless jurisdictional
basis. Because of this, the U.S. continues to protest other
countries' uses of the basis.'
An intent-based jurisdiction has several benefits. Intent-
based jurisdiction is reasonably limited to attacks intended to
harm a country's nationals. This represents a firmer basis to
exercise jurisdiction than pure nationality of the victim. It also
eases concerns about fairness because the defendant has to
target a particular country and its nationals. Thus, foreign
countries will be more likely to accept the basis and less likely to
protest that the U.S. is using an extravagant basis of jurisdiction.
The proposed jurisdictional basis will be recognized by the
U.S. for all substantive areas where it could apply (physical
attacks based on nationality). This easing of the terrorism-only
recognition found in the current use of passive personality will
allow other countries to use and recognize the basis. Currently,
states that are not the subject of frequent terror attacks have no
incentive to recognize passive personality jurisdiction-but only
in terrorist attacks. States may, however, be interested in
protecting their nationals from acts of genocide, coercion, or
racial violence that occur because of their citizens' nationalities.
When these countries look to see if reciprocity exists between
themselves and the United States, an intent-based jurisdiction
could be recognized by both countries, where the other country
may have found no reciprocity for a passive personality basis due
to U.S. objections for its use.
The U.S. will be able to retain the parts of its antiterrorism
laws relevant to its national security, while gaining allies and
broader acceptance of its judgments, by removing the less
effective parts of its civil antiterrorism laws.
c. Convincing Judges: A Clear Proxy for U.S. Interests
If U.S. antiterrorism laws are redesigned to reflect an intent-
based national security jurisdiction, it would send a clear
message to judges and the public that civil suits are an important
.. See Watson, supra note 44, at 11-12.
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part of the U.S. security strategy and that important interests
are served in allowing such suits. This will satisfy the last
principle of practicality.
Despite some challenges in proving intent to attack a U.S.
national, a jurisdictional basis focused on this intent will reduce
courts' unwillingness to entertain antiterrorism suits. The
reason for this would be that the doctrines commonly used to
eliminate suits with a U.S. interest would be inapplicable or
subsumed into an ATA written to reflect the intent principle.
First, personal jurisdiction would likely no longer be an issue in
suits against nonstate terrorist actors because the new ATA
would reflect the currently recognized exercise of jurisdiction
over acts intended to have an effect in the jurisdiction.2 67 Given
this argument, the imprimatur of Congress provided by its
passing of a new statute will encourage courts to look more
favorably on finding personal jurisdiction. Ensuring a stronger
U.S. interest may even motivate courts to eliminate their current
distinction between personal jurisdiction over state sponsors of
terror and private actors. In both cases, the definition of
terrorism under U.S. law will ensure that the defendants could
expect to end up in U.S. courts for each situation that U.S.
substantive law applied because the terrorists would have to
target U.S. nationals for being U.S. nationals.
Similarly, the doctrine of forum non conveniens can be
abrogated for foreign plaintiffs who were injured in attacks
directed at U.S. nationals. A strong U.S. interest exists in this
situation: furthering counterterrorism policy. Foreign victims
may, in some instances, be the only victims of an attack, even if
the attack was aimed at U.S. nationals. The allowance of suits
by foreign nationals would not open the floodgates because they
would still have to show that the attack was directed at U.S.
nationals, which ensures a U.S. interest in litigation held in U.S.
courts. Forum non conveniens would be less appropriate in this
situation because the U.S. wants to ensure that these plaintiffs
get all the advantages a U.S. forum provides them, particularly
that of broad discovery.
Lastly, the FSIA could be amended to allow for antiterrorism
suits against more than the four countries designated state
sponsors of terror, so long as the attack involved was directed at
... See supra note 194.
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U.S. nationals. This would result in a limited expansion of
foreign countries' current amenability to suit. The increased
potential liability would be offset by the gain in having better
information on the contacts of foreign states to anti-American
terrorist groups. It would tangibly raise the public relations cost
of supporting anti-American terrorism and would also deter
countries with economic or foreign relations ties from engaging in
such conduct.
The drawback to the intent-based approach would be that
proving purpose or intent could be difficult, certainly more
difficult than showing nationality. However, the more anti-
American the attack or organization, the easier this may be to
show. For example, an attack on a housing complex where U.S.
service members are stationed,"8 an attack on the offices of an
American corporation, or an attack on a hotel frequently used by
Americans strongly supports an inference that the attack was
directed at U.S. nationals. Discovery into the motivation and
ideology of the alleged terrorists could also provide evidence
supporting an inference of intent. This could lead to information
on things such as whether they possessed or distributed anti-
American propaganda. Thus, the main issue in every terrorist
lawsuit would also be the most important in terms of American
interests: Do these actors threaten the security of U.S. interests
and nationals either domestically or abroad?
CONCLUSION
The idea that the American legal system can eliminate
terrorism as a tactic remains a quixotic goal. Civil antiterrorism
laws should be reformed to aid a more practical goal: securing
the United States. This Article demonstrated that the bases
for prescriptive jurisdiction currently recognized under
international law do not allow a country to adequately respond to
unconventional national security threats. To fix the problem
requires developing a prescriptive jurisdictional basis that
reflects the interests of the U.S. and other countries in applying
their own laws to unconventional national security threats,
particularly terrorism. This Article introduced such a principle-
..8 See, e.g., Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229,
264-65 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding Iran liable for attacks on Khobar Towers in Saudi
Arabia).
[Vol. 83:12011272
2009] FINDING TERRORISTS' INTENT 1273
"intent based national security jurisdiction"-which will allow the
U.S. to reform the civil antiterrorism laws to align the benefits of
civil litigation with the country's national security needs. This
Article then showed that such a jurisdictional basis furthers
the goals of security, legality, and practicality. With such
reforms, the civil justice system supplements the U.S.
antiterrorism efforts in criminal prosecutions and intelligence
gathering, furthering U.S. security interests.
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